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ABSTRACT
Does a government learn from its experiences? If so, what kinds of
learning have taken place or failed to take place? The case of the public
housing process in Taiwan during the period from 1949 to 1985 is studied to
investigate these questions.
Taiwan experienced three consecutive stages in its public housing
process: Ad Hoc Action (1949-1958), Decentralized Management (1959-
1974), and Centralized Planning (1975-present) Stages. In each stage, there
have been changes in policy development, governmental organizations, and
responses to and communication processes concerning housing problems.
The two periods within the Decentralized Management and the Centralized
Planning Stages were pivotal periods: these were the Gestation Period
(1968-1974) and the Evaluation Period (1982-present), respectively. These
two periods were bridges in mediating changes that occurred in the next
stages.
From the Gestation Period to the Evaluation Period, the formulation of
the global problem shifted from housing shortages to housing vacancies; the
public housing program began with the intention of inspiring and leading the
private sector but ended by imitating the private sector; the program started
by trying to shelter the poor and low-income families and ended up by serving
middle-income groups.
In order to explain these shifts, the characteristics of the dialogues
within and among the political, planning, and operational forums and the
dialogues among the different levels of the government are analyzed. First,
each forum put its own stamp on the public housing program to gain control
over the program; the program was politicized, professionalized, and
operationalized over time. Second, the objectives of the program were
transformed by each forum's search for immediate goals through problem-
setting and problem-solving processes as the problem was transmitted from
one forum to another. Third, the original incongruity between the espoused
policy and policy-in-use of each forum became an intrinsic feature of the
dialogues. Fourth, disjointedness of the dialogues across the forums
truncated and transformed the link between the error-detection and error-
correction processes.
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During the Gestation Period, public housing was politicized in the search
for a tool for correcting errors in the previous administration's social welfare
credentials. During the Centralized Planning Stage, public housing was
professionalized by the planning forum, which sought professional
standards for the physical development of the public housing program.
During the Evaluation Period, public housing was operationalized by the
operational forum, which sought a solution for hurdling over the difficulties
of acquiring land, while searching for an efficient strategy to achieve the
immediate production goal; for example, the operational forum created joint
venture projects. Moreover, faced with low sales of units but continuing
construction, the central planners suggested that construction stop; yet
there was no dialogue between planning and political forums at the central
level. The local planners then turned to the local mayors and Hsien leaders
for their practical support in finding land that would enable the continued
production of housing units to meet the original target. As a result, the
target was shifted from the poor and the low-income group to the middle-
income group and the original intentions of leading the private sector
resulted instead in its competing with and imitating the private sector; and
the housing problem was reframed as vacancies instead of shortages.
In summary, the complex process beneath the shifts can be explained as
institutional learning that occurred in the Taiwanese Public Housing
Process, within each forum but not across the forums. The kinds of learning
that occurred included temporary, instrumental, imitative, and local
learning, but not global or double-loop learning.
Dissertation Supervisor: Donald A. Sch6n, Ford Professor
of Urban Studies and Education
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
QUESTIONS
1.1 General Question: How do we account for the change?
Most developing countries have experienced housing problems of some
kind due to rapid changes in the need and demand for housing. These
changes have been the result not only from the natural increase in
population and households but also from rural urban migration. In addition,
housing problems have been compounded by the complicated processes
of urbanization and economic development.
To solve their housing problems, the developing nations have formulated
many policy options. Yet, housing problems persist. Both the literature
and housing conditions in developing countries show that the problems are
more acute for low-income groups; in fact, most nations claim to focus on
creating housing for low-income groups. One of the common remedies the
governments have chosen is constructing public housing. The rationale for
11
low-income public housing is that because low-income groups can not afford
to buy and because the building industry, ever mindful of profits, sees
small house as unprofitable, governments are responsible for housing low-
income groups. Throughout its history as an independent nation, Taiwan
has adopted that same rationale. For merely 40 years, Taiwan's public
housing policy has been in a constant state of change: the governmental
organizations that develop and implement housing policy have been shaped,
disbanded, expanded, and reshaped.
In order to raise specific research questions based on what can be
observed in the case of Taiwan, I will summarize the history of public
housing process in Taiwan below.
The term, the "Public Housing Process" indicates the evolutionary
process related to the development of public housing policies and
organizations, and will be used throughout this study. The Public Housing
Process in Taiwan can be described as having three stages: the ad hoc action;
the decentralized management; and the centralized planning stages.
During these stages there were two pivotal periods, or sub-stages, of the
public housing process: the Gestation (1968-1974) and the Evaluation
(1982-present) periods. During this process, public housing policies, goals,
and problem perception evolved as did organizations and responses to
housing problems.
The question then arises: how can we explain the changes?
The conventional research on housing policies conducted on a project
basis tends to focus on analysis on a particular policy option but not to
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explain the historical process of development of housing policy, and the
historical studies tend to offer explanations of the changes but they do not
explain the internal governmental learning process that might have been
resulted in bringing about the changes.
There are several possible ways of explaining these phenomena of
change.
" The changes indicate that a government behaves as if it were a
pendulum, cycling back and forth between extremes; or else that it
exhibits a continuous process of trial and error.
* The changes indicate that a government adopts the most
fashionable policy measures it can. Therefore, a given change
reflects the change of a policy-in-fashion.
* The changes indicate that a government dispenses its power in the
interest of the dominant political group; a change, therefore,
reflects political claims and controversies.
* The changes are consistent with a simple dynamic power change.
When a new leader or personality comes into power, he changes the
policy. Therefore, changes in policy are merely the result of the
changes in personality.
* The changes indicate the possibility of the government
undergoing a learning process. Successful learning may be
schematized as starting with an initial stage of reflection on
governmental experiences. This reflection initiates a loop-like
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process, the next stage of which is a collective inquiry which
eventually produces ideas in good currency. Developing these ideas
marks the third stage of the learning process and are eventually
transformed into a new policy, which will displace the previous
policy. This learning process can take the form of many patterns
ranging from simple to complex, and occurring in sequences different
from the schematic view presented above. A failure of learning or
distorted learning takes place when this loop-like process fails to
develop because of a barrier, such as malcommunication. The
changes in Public Housing Process, according to this theory, are the
results of either success or failure of a given pattern of governmental
learning.
These different ways of accounting for the changes observed in public
housing in Taiwan will be called the Pendulum Theory, the Fashion Theory,
the Political Contention Theory, the Personality Theory, and the
Governmental Learning Theory.
1.1.1 The Pendulum Theory
The essence of the pendulum theory is based on the "bounded rationality"
concepts introduced by Simon (1969). Individuals are limited in their ability
to make rational decisions. A group, an organization, and a government
which is a collective body of groups of individuals also has a bounded
rationality. A government practices its policy through its continuous
pendulum-like behavior in a narrower sense of trial and error. The
phenomena that the pendulum theory postulates is that a government tries
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out one particular policy and, when it sees it is a failure, it
automatically tries an opposite policy.
Suppose a government behaves or believes that it ought to behave as
this theory implies. In order to improve the performance of a government,
it needs quick and accurate performance control and evaluation system
to oversee policy implementation and to evaluate the results of policy
implementation. At the same time, it needs a flexible organizational
structure so that the government can pursue different policies without
losing time in shaping up the government organization.
1.1.2 The Fashion Theory
The essence of the fashion theory is that the popularity of a particular
policy based on the experience and evidence from abroad at a particular time
determines government policy changes. In order for a government to behave
as this theory implies and perform well, a government needs a "tailor" to
alter policies so that they fit to the situation and context of the nation. It also
needs advanced information processing and communication systems to
communicate with other governments and international agencies and to
keep track of policy measures so that it can adopt a policy-in-fashion in a
time of need and know the experiences other countries have had with similar
problems. Finally, in order to be up to date and informed, a government
needs to operate an international idea bank to have ideas available, possibly
in countries with the similar problems.
This theory can explain why certain policy measures become
predominantly implemented in different countries.
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1.1.3 The Political Contention
The main point of this perspective is whose interest is accounted for by
the changes in policy. A ruling group constantly seeks to support and
maintain the interests of the dominant group; policy changes are based
on the interest on the dominant group. In order to improve the quality of
government policy, a structural change is necessary so that different groups,
and it is hoped the low-income group, can be represented as a dominant
group.
This perspective identifies historical and structural grounds as the
reasons why low-income groups have rarely been the beneficiary of housing
policies.
1.1.4 The Personality Theory
The essence of this perspective is the emergence of power and
leadership. Particularly in authoritarian countries where a streamlined
hierarchical order is the basis of government organizations, a new
personality with a new style of leadership could mean a change in policy in
every aspect. Because this theory is a kind of weak individual learning
theory, its application requires a particular kind of environment, if,
indeed, a government thinks it ought to behave as this theory implies. In
order to improve the quality of policy by improving the quality of the
leader's learning, a government needs a mature political environment
where a qualified leader can emerge and be selected through a fair and
democratic process and where there are both overall public education and
16
constructive competition among the individual learning that a leader
experiences to every locality of a nation, it needs a tight hierarchical
administrative order and streamlined performance.
This theory can explain some aspects of the different characteristics and
styles of policies at different periods of time or under different
administrations.
1.1.5 The Governmental Learning Theory
The essence of this perspective is that the learning process is a tool for
investigating changes in a policy. When a government does learn, the
change in policy is not something that has automatically occurred. The
change is rather through reflection on governmental experience and this
reflection mediates a collective inquiry which produces new ideas in good
currency. In order to improve policy performance, a government needs to
have an extensive capacity for learning. A government needs to find a
way to organize collective inquiries; to keep group memories; to facilitate
ideas in good currency; to create an environment to feed back the
results of learning to the next stage; and to provide an open
communication system instead of a control system. For instance, a central
government should be able to facilitate what local governments can do,
and the collective inquiry ought to be raised at local levels.
This perspective is based on organizational and governmental learning
theories by Argyris and Sch6n, Schon, and Etheredge (Argyris and Sch6n,
1978: Sch6n, 1971, and Etheredge, 1979). This theory explains the
process of learning resulting in policy changes as occurring in a time series
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scheme. It also provides a framework for determining whether a change in
policy can be understood as learning and for evaluating the quality of
learning that occurs in a learning system.
1.2 Hypotheses and Focused Questions
We have explored different perspectives for accounting for the changes
occurred in a government.
In order to select and elaborate the framework that will be used in this
thesis, more focused, specific questions need to be raised based on the
general questions. The specific questions are:
* Has governmental learning occurred in the Taiwan Public Housing
Process?
* If so, what kinds of learning have occurred?
* What aspects of evolution of the Taiwan Public Housing Process
can be explained by governmental learning and how is it better to
explain oppose to other theories?
The pendulum and fashion theories might explain the peculiar behavior
of a kind of weak and limited learning which might occur in a government.
These theories both focus on comparing the end product of government policy
in a constrained environment although the constraints differ for each theory.
The pendulum theory assumes the constraint is the limited policy options.
For example, a government may choose to centralize its planning
processes and when this option fails, it decentralizes them only to swing
18
back to centralization after the latter fails. The fashion theory assumes
that there is the constraint that a government has a limited way of searching
for policy options at the domestic level. The political contention and the
personality theories explain how a group or an individual can change a
public policy. These theories account for changes in policy as products of
political power or personal style.
These theories deal with only one facet of how change might occur and do
not provide above concerning governmental learning. These theories can
be employed to explain some aspects of distorted or limited learning that
might have occurred in the Taiwan case. The governmental learning
theory, however, provides a multifaceted, dynamic, and procedural
framework to test whether governmental learning has occurred; moreover,
it can be employed to detect possible weak points for governmental learning
so that some policy implications can be drawn.
This research aims to investigate the process a government undergoes
in dealing with changes and problems and to identity kinds of exercises a
government can do in order to cope with the changes and problems they
face. Therefore, governmental learning theory will be employed as a basic
scheme to test the hypotheses and specific questions, because it appears
to have the greatest explanatory value of the various theories described
above. The four other theories will be employed and elaborated in order to
explain the limited or distorted learning that might have occurred in the
Taiwan case.
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In answering the specific questions I raised, the following hypotheses
can be formulated based on the case study of the Taiwan Public Housing
Process and the theories that were employed.
* The changes in Taiwan Public Housing Process can be the result
of success and failure of different kinds of governmental learning;
* At different stages of the process, reflection on public housing
policy-in-use mediates to raise different patterns of collective inquiry;
* These patterns produces new ideas in good currency; and
* New ideas in good currency set the stage for new espoused public
housing policies and cause public housing organizations to be
established, rearranged, and discarded.
These hypotheses will be tested and elaborated in order to answer the
questions raised.
20
CHAPTER 2
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING POLICIES
AND INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
Housing and housing policies have been studied' through
economic,architectural, sociological, anthropological, and political
perspectives. In this study, we assume housing is an issue that needs to be
studied with various frameworks or perspectives. This research aims to
investigate whether governments learn from their experience and if so, what
kinds of learning have taken place or failed to take place.Unlike
conventional research on housing and housing policy, this approach to the
study of housing therefore, includes research into the learning behavior of a
government, as well as housing and housing policy. This chapter reviews the
literature on housing and on governmental learning.
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2.1 Perspectives on Housing Policies
The abundant literature on housing has witnessed the failure of housing
policies and the persistence of housing problems in developing countries.
Because we wanted to know whether this literature can explain the housing
policies that have evolved in Taiwan, I classified this literature according to
its academic perspective and attitude toward housing into following
categories: research with a classical economic perspective; that with a neo-
Marxists' perspective; and that with an empirical perspective. At the end of
this section all these perspectives are synthesized.
2.1.1 The Classical Economic Perspective
The essence of the classical economic perspective was the notion of
productivity. Since housing was viewed as a sector with low productivity and
"the only road to greater material welfare is through greater economic
productivity" (Grebler, 1955), housing investment in the conventional
economic strategies of the 1950's and the 1960's was considered to be a social
overhead or welfare expenditure, and,therefore, state intervention was
discouraged.
2.1.2 The Neo-Classical Economic Perspective
This perspective was shaped by focusing on the building industries and
their impact on the economy as a whole. The key notion was the"multiplier
effect" of the building industry (Gorynski, 1971), according to which the
industry was believed to increase growth of the economy as a whole. Like the
classical perspective, the neo-classical economic perspective was also based
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on the notion of productivity, but the perspective differed in looking at the
effect of the building industry on the whole economy. Therefore, Grebler
(1973) found that "improved housing means improved productivity"
(Grebler, 1973) and a case study of a Columbia project (Fox, 1976) showed
that housing investment is an "engine" for economic development. Most
arguments favoring housing investment revolve around a revised view of the
productivity of housing and recognize it to be a potential sector for fuller
employment for two reasons: the housing industry is labor intensive and the
impact of an environment improved by better housing correlated with an
increase in people's productivity (Stretton, 1979).
This view is more advanced and comprehensive than the classical
economic perspective, for it takes housing into account as part of a larger
economic process. The neo-classical assessment of housing productivity
includes not only the cost of the initial investment but its impacts on the
other related industries as well. However, this notion suffered from proving
specifically how productive the various "multiplier effect" is and what
"productivity" means. The advantage of this perspective was that it gave the
political leader a positive view of housing without changing the focus on
economic development.
2.1.3 The "Self-Help" Perspective
The self-help perspective stems from the notion that housing conditions
can be improved by progressive building activity with limited state
intervention. Public housing and self-help schemes became competing ideas
in dealing with housing problems in developing countries. Public housing
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was considered to be an expensive way of providing housing because of the
cumbersome and expensive government bureaucracy. Consequently, self-
help scheme became to be considered cheaper, more practical ways to shelter
the poor.
The essence of the self-help scheme is the idea of providing shelter with
less state intervention than in the past and with more "'people's creativity."
This idea is based on the assumption that people's creative energy can build
more houses than government bureaucracy. In an aided self-help scheme, a
government can help in preparing land, providing basic infrastructure, and
getting cheap materials. The construction is left to the residents.
Various types of self-help schemes have increased throughout the
developing countries during the 1970's, largely due to financial resources
international organizations have made available. For example, in the 1970's
governments in developing countries changed widespread policy concerning
squatter settlements from one of eradication to upgrading and sites-and-
services programs and the World Bank assisted such policy changes (Keare,
1982 ) by funding projects in developing countries which were basically
applications of the self-help scheme advocated by Turner and many others
(Turner, 1965).
Turner inspired many researchers to conduct empirical case studies and
to research the lives of the poor, that is to learn from the people in the
developing countries. Many research has developed, not only on housing
programs but also on the "marginal" life of the poor, which centers on the
informal sector and marginality. The concept of self-help led to creating of
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many low-income housing projects and made the governments' attitude
toward squatter settlements change from seeing them as the source of a
problem to the source of a solution. As many governments throughout the
developing countries have gained experience in self-help projects for some
ten years, throughout the developing countries, numerous critiques are
emerging against the assumptions, target populations, and strategies of
organization of self-help schemes.
Korean self-help programs provide examples of the difficulties of
translating Turner's ideas into the realities of developing nations. Since the
land readjustment scheme was put into practice in Korea in 1947, projects
have been oriented mainly toward the middle class, not low-income groups.
Although Turner developed his ideas in the 1970's and intended such
programs to reach low income groups, the reality of the long history of such
prototype programs in Korea illustrates the practical difficulties of Turner's
targeting assumptions. Turner intends self-help schemes to maximize
people's creative intentions, but virtually all aspects of korean self-help
housing have been institutionalized, thereby downplaying the importance of
individual contributions, and self-help projects are highly organized
government programs.
2.1.4 The Neo-Marxists' Perspective
The neo-Marxist perspective on housing can best be understood by
reviewing the critiques on the self-help housing scheme which have emerged
recently, because this perspective has been developed through a theoretical
critique of the proposition of self-help.
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The debate between John Turner and Rod Burgess on the self-help
proposition resembles the debate between the anarchist Sax and Fredrich
Engels a century ago, as Burgess himself mentions in his critique of Turner's
work (Burgess, 1982). "In 1872, Engels was engaged in an intense debate
with the anarchist Sax over the role of self-help and state assistance in the
solution of the housing question" (Burgess 1982: 57). As Engels did with
Sax's views, Burgess examined Turner's concepts on housing and drew
attention to the contradictions within them. He showed that the policy
implications of Turner's self-help scheme for Latin American housing
articulated the interests of the dominant class and argued that self-help was
doomed to failure because it could not accommodate self-help housing as a
commodity in a system in which the capitalist mode of production is
dominant.
Harms used a conflict model of society to examine why the practice of self-
help occurs. He uses a historical perspective which has been drawn from
examples of self-help projects in Germany, Britain, the United States and
Latin America to show that self-help projects have been propagated by
dominating groups to manage the political and economic crisis in the
capitalist countries (Harms, 1982).
Like Harms and Burgess, Castells criticized the romantic concept of slum
as a solution to the housing shortage instead of a problem. Castells saw such
a view as a distortion of the historical and social variables into nonhistorical
and spatial constraints; the problem of slum cannot be solved under the
capitalism because capitalism requires that slums exit. For a Marxist, slums
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exist only in relation to their specific historical context; capitalism creates
and maintains slums for its own purposes: to create a more or less
segregated source of reserve labor willing to work for very little money
because of its desperate living conditions. Skinner evaluated the benefits of
the self-help project as at best a temporary technical solution to a problem
intrinsic to the capitalist system and felt that such programs "at their worst
may be a prelude to repression" (Skinner, 1982: 227)He argued that self-help
schemes contain the potential for "super-exploitation" and that the solution
to housing problems can only be found through a "commitment to
fundamental transformations in society" and "structural change."
Such neo-Marxist perspectives center on the critique of the self-help
schemes favored by the so-called intermediate technology school or
anarchistic liberals. Obviously, the neo-Marxist perspective points out
structural and historical issues that so called the liberals ignored. However,
from their long and detailed arguments, one can glean only abstract
recommendations, most of which focus on a fundamental transformation of
society and structural changes. Therefore, although Marxist analysis may
help us to understand the political economy of housing policy, it is most
likely not to give practical alternative recommendations.
2.1.5 The Contextual Perspective
Unlike theoretically oriented neo-Marxist analysis, some researchers
have raised important questions based either on their empirical work or on
methodological problems concerning how housing has been studied. This
work can be categorized neither as intermediate technology school liberal
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nor as neo-Marxist. For instance, the up-market movement on the
government-aided self-help scheme in Bogota, Columbia was questioned by
Doebele and Peattie (1976). They stated that this scheme was "creaming off"
the "more established members of the working class" and "leaving the others
behind to find as they may be in the unorganized system" (Doebele and
Peattie 1976: 4). They argued that such a policy was dangerous because it
physically separated the relatively privileged groups from the urban poor
who are dependent on them for the local trickle-down effects of their income.
Stretton has pointed out that classical economic theory has defined
housing as a consumer durable good rather than as productive capital and
that most economic analyses ignore the goods and services which households
produce for themselves or for informal exchange (Stretton 197 :111).
On housing policies in general, Peattie raised the following question as a
"puzzle." "Why is government housing policy in developing countries so
characteristically odd?" She pointed out a need for future research on
"specific places" (Peattie, 1979: 1021). The essence of the contribution of the
empirical perspective is that it expanded the concept of housing from shelter
to housing and a commodity in a multifaceted system, that is, in its larger
economic, political, social, and cultural context. It also questioned
conventional assumptions concerning attitudes of the poor toward housing as
an investment. Empirical researchers found that if the poor have money
they would often rather invest it in other areas of their lives than their
housing. if the poor themselves are given improved housing, they prefer to
sell it, squat, and to invest the money in a small-scale business venture in an
effort to secure a better livelihood or, for those who were unemployed, a
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means of earning a living at all. This research raises the question that if the
poor themselves prefer economic pathways to improving their standards of
living, why do governments persist in making even the limited efforts they
make to provide housing for the poor?
2.1.6 Synthesis of The Perspectives
Research on housing policy has evolved from through five different
phases: the classical economic focus on the low productivity of the housing
sector; the neo-classical economic view of the multiplier effects of the
housing sector ; self-help schemes -- an anarchistic,architectural view; the
class-conflict theory of the neo-Marxist view: the empirical view of the
multifaceted character of housing.
The classical economic view and neo-classical economic view explain why
housing investment was discouraged and later encouraged or legitimized in
the context of economic growth, to the point where it became a government's
first priority. The self-help scheme explains the emergence of low-income
housing projects in the 1970's. Critiques by the neo-Marxists indicate the
determinants of political economy of housing policy; and the empiricalists'
questions point to directions for future research on housing.
Research on housing can be usefully evaluated from the point of view of
the debate between Turner and Burgess. Turner privatized housing
problems, insisting that they could only be solved through the direct creative
efforts of individuals, acting on their own behalf. Turner felt that
government bureaucracy is cumbersome and ineffective and, furthermore,
that government planners are ignorant. From an entirely different
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perspective, Burgess also discredit the role of the government in creating
solution to the housing problems of the poor. He believes that governments
act essentially in the interests of the dominant class and not in the interests
of the poor. From my point of view, Turner underestimates the actual power
of the government in developing countries in the following way: when
government funds are directed into a project, it appears almost inevitable on
the basis of experience that government will institutionalize the process.
Using Turner's terminology, housing policy and implementation in
developing countries is done mostly by "administrative planning" rather
than"legislative planning," that is, instead of making guidelines that allow
for individual input and creativity in how plans are designed and
implemented, the government formulates detailed procedures for carrying
out a plan, which is then centrally administered.
Like Turner, Burgess discredits the role of the government in creating
solutions to housing problems, but from an entirely different perspective.
Burgess's perspective contains fertile ideas concerning the political economic
aspects of housing policy. The principal limitation of Burgess's ideas are that
he sees the forces of the political economy as absolute determinants of
whether and what kind of housing will be provided for the poor. Although
these factors have an undeniably powerful effect on housing programs, I
believe that government planners can have some positive effect, although a
limited one, on the process of formulating policy and implementation. This
effect would be in the form of immediate measures taken to provide for the
survival and well-being of the poorest members of a society. Undoubtedly
such measures will meet with opposition from members of the dominant
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class if they do not coincide with their interests, and such programs will
undergo distortion in their implementation by the government, which will
act to ensure its continuing control of how the resources are distributed. In
the interest of providing temporary and partial solutions to the housing
problems of the poor, however, as many provisions as possible must be made
for their immediate needs. Because of his ideologically determined
perspective, Burgess makes no recommendations concerning how to solve
housing problems other than through a massive structural transformation of
a capitalist society.
The lever for introducing and implementing plans for housing that are
favorable to the poor may be in gaining some control of a process of internal
governmental learning. In order to investigate whether such a lever is
feasible, this study will focus on understanding whether and how
governments learn from housing experience. Since most previous research
on housing policy is descriptive or prescriptive and issue-oriented, it has
focused on specific cases of housing projects. Such research does not provide a
basis for understanding government behavior in developing housing
solutions that may be applied in a number of cultural contexts.
2.2 Institutional Learning
As Etheredge (Etheredge, 1979) pointed out, "government learning is a
new interdisciplinary field of social science inquiry" and "only three books
address[ed] the problem". Major theories in institutional learning have
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been formulated by Sch6n (Sch6n, 1971, 1987), and Argyris and Sch6n(1974,
1978).
2.2.1 Defining Learning
What constitutes "learning"? Hilgard and Bower (1975) define it as
follows: "learning refers to the change in a subjects behavior to a given
situation brought about by his repeated experiences of that situation." (17)
When we observe the behavior of the Taiwanese government, the changes
occurred in the public housing policy and in the structure of the organization
which is in charge or solving the persistent housing problems. in hilgard and
Bower's term the government learning occurred. Then, what kind of change
occurred in a government can be understood as learning?
Etheredge gives an approximate answer to this question. "True learning
should be assessed not by behavior change or attitude change but by the dual
criteria of increased intelligence and sophistication of thought, and of
increased effectiveness of behavior" (Etheredge,1979: 4)
For example, in assessing the development of the organizational
structure of public housing -related bureaus and the more complicated and
comprehensive policies they formulated and implemented, learning can be
hypothesized because the Taiwan government attempted to understand the
housing problems in a more comprehensive context. That is, effectiveness as
mentioned by Etheredge an adequate indicator for assessing the evolution of
becoming intelligent? Etheredge himself mentions that "complete
knowledge can provide only limited control and effectiveness" (Etheredge,
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1979:5) Moreover, the question of whether a government is effective in a
particular policy area may depend not only on how well the government can
perform but also on how self-reflective it can be.
2.2.2 Organizational Learning
Argyris and Sch6n (1978) describe the kinds of organizational learning
that may arise from the question of self-reflectiveness of an organization.
The theory assumes that an organization may have self-reflecting capacities.
The most limited kind of self-reflective capacity is that involving error-
detection and error-correction which in turn will permit the organization to
carry on its present policies or achieve its present objectives. This kind of
learning is called single-loop learning (:71). The more profound learning is
"double-loop learning" which Argyris and Sch6n describe as a kind
of"organizational inquiry which resolves incompatible organizational norms
by setting new priorities and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the
norms themselves together with associated strategies and assumptions."(:24)
The most complex form of learning is "Deutro-learning", a kind of learning
where "members [of an organization] learn about organizational learning
and encode their results in images and maps" (:29).
2.2.3 Governmental Learning
Sch6n depicted the nature of government as a vehicle for public learning.
The most important characteristics of governmental learning is its
characteristics of public character. That is, in public learning "government
undertakes a continuing, directed inquiry into the nature, causes and
resolutions of problems" (Sch6n, 1971: 116). Then, how does a government
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learn? "If government is to learn to solve new public problems, it must also
learn to create the systems for doing so and to discard the structure and
mechanisms grown up around old problems. ..... It is to design and bring into
being the institutional process through which new problems can continually
be confronted and old structures continually discarded." Sch6n defined it a
"government's version of the more general problem of response to the loss of
the stable state" (:116-117)
If we understand a government as a learning system, the crucial question
becomes how are perceptions of the consequences of actions fed back into the
governmental learning process. The feedback process of the governmental
learning system can be the key element in investigating the learning
process. These learning perspectives explain the process of policy inquiry,
reflections, and the changes that might have resulted from different kinds
of feedback activities.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CASE HISTORY:
THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROCESS
This chapter focuses on the evolutionary processes related to the
development of public housing policies and organization in order to explore
1) whether government learning has occ.urred; 2) what kinds of learning
have taken place or failed to take place. This case scenario will show how
goals were identified, what policies were actually formulated, how the
policies were implemented, what problems and puzzles emerged, and how
public housing organizations reacted to problems in order to intervene or
change public housing policy and its organizations. I will call this process
the Public housing Process, a term that will be used throughout this
research.
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3.1 Methodology and Information
3.1.1 Methodology
In order to answer the questions raised in the previous chapter, we need
to know the history of Taiwan Public Housing Process and the possible
periods during which collective inquiries might have resulted in bringing
about a change in stage in the Taiwan Public Housing Process.
First, the history of the Public Housing Process should be examined
including the following: the espoused policies, the policy-in-use, the
organizational changes, and how the government thought about housing
problems and responded to them.
Second, the Taiwan Public Housing Process should be categorized into
several stages in order to investigate how the changes occurred. These stages
need to be characterized on the basis of how the public housing policies were
dealt with between the central and the local governments.
Third, the possible periods in which collective inquiries might have
occurred need to be investigated in an accurate time series in order to
examine the detailed processes and themes of governmental learning: the
way the inquiries mediated, raised, and led to the change of espoused
policy at the next stage.
Fourth, in order to investigate the kinds of learning that might have
occurred, the inquiries need to be examined to determine whether they were
on the basis of problem setting or solving.
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In order to identify the possible factors that set the initial stage for
changes, I must investigate the overall environment of the Taiwan public
housing process, such as the political changes and social movements in
relation to the process.
To conduct this process-oriented research applying organizational
analysis, semi-structured and unstructured interviews with informants
were carried out to get the detailed information on the Taiwan public
housing process.
The following institutions have been selected as the most important
government organizations in the context of this research.
* Planning Institution: the Department of Public Housing, the
Ministry of the Interior
" Implementational Institutions: The departments of Public Housing
of Taipei City and of other local governments
* Advisory Institution: the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Council for Economic Planning and Development
at the Executive Yuan
3.1.2 Information and data
In order to acquire an understanding of the history the Taiwan public
housing process, the following information is needed:
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* Espoused policies and policy-in-use on land, public housing loans,
and on clientele for public housing;
* The numbers of public housing units, categorized by size and type,
produced during each stage of the process;
* Overall urban development patterns over time;
* Location on public housing over time;
* The decision-making and the implementation process of public
housing policies;
* The political changes and social movements over time;
* The organizational working process of the institutions selected in the
previous section; and
* The discussions and ideas on public housing in Taiwan over time.
The information has been collected from the two field research carried
on in the summers of 1984 and 1985 and communications with the
informants in Taiwan and in the U.S. This information was collected
through partially structured and unstructured interviews, personal
observation, published government documents, statistics, memos,
newspaper articles, and the relevant professional and academic journals.
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3.2 The Public Housing Process
For some 40 years since independence, the public housing process in
Taiwan can be viewed to have passed through three stages which I will
call: the ad hoc action, the decentralized management, and the centralized
planning periods.
The policies of 1949 to 1958, the ad hoc action period, were mainly
responses both to rapid migration from mainland China and to damage
from typhoons that brought about emergency measures. From 1959 to 1975,
the decentralized management period, the provincial government was
responsible for the management of several aspects of public housing.
From 1976 to the present, the centralized planning period, the central
government identified housing as a major problem area and implemented
the national long-term public housing plan. During these 40 years, two
pivotal periods associated with intervention in policy and housing
organizations were seen. The first pivotal period was from 1968 to 1975
within the decentralized management period and the second was from 1982
to present and occurred within the centralized planning period.
3.2.1 The Ad Hoc Action Stage: 1949-1958
In 1945, Taiwan gained independence from Japanese colonial control and
in 1949, Taiwan established an independent nationalist government. In the
four-year period, 1949-1953, the migration of one million mainlanders to
Taiwan created housing shortages. In 1953, the damage from the typhoon
"Kert" compounded housing shortages and pushed the new government
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into acting to relieve this emergency situation. In 1954, the government
organized an emergency action team, called the Urban Housing
Construction Team in the Ministry of the Interior. This was the first
attempt to set up a formal housing organization in Taiwan. In 1955, the
team was reorganized as the Public Housing Construction Committee
under the direct supervision of the Executive Yuan. The members of the
organization were from the various relevant ministries, Yuans, and the
U.S. Embassy, who worked together as needed on an ad hoc basis. The
specific organizations participating in the committee were the Legislative
Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, the Control Yuan, the
National Assembly, the Economic Affairs and the Financial Ministries,
and the American Embassy. In May 1957, the committee members were
reduced to five and reorganized under the Ministry of the Interior.
The actions taken by the organizations were managing and
allocating two financial resources, U.S. aid and domestic bank loan. The
U.S aid was utilized for self-help housing projects designed to relieve the
damage from the typhoon Kert. The domestic bank loans were allocated
mainly to central government officials, representatives, and government
employees for their housing mortgage and construction fund. The funds
totaled NT$ 103,398,8000 during this stage.
The most important action taken by the Public Housing Construction
Committee was promulgation of the Public Housing Loan Act in 1957. The
act guided and guaranteed low-interest, long-term loans for public
housing, by creating ceilings for duration and interest rate of 10 years or
longer and 6% or less, respectively.
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The number of housing units constructed with the help of these
resources from 1955 to 1958 was 8,724 and the annual figures are shown in
Table 3.3. This act is still utilized, although the interest rates and the term
of the loans been revised. At the time of this writing, the loans are for 15 to
20 years at 6%.
The clientele for U.S. aid and domestic bank loans were different.
The U.S. aid was given to urban residents, farmers, workers, and fisherman
who were victimized by the typhoon, while bank loans were available
mainly to the migrant mainlanders who were working in the government.
Relief of the housing shortage was the vague and general goal espoused
by the central government. However, as the central government allocated
the housing loans, particularly the domestic bank loarns, they focused on
helping the "needy" who had migrated from the mainland and were working
in the central government. There were, therefore, two different sets of
goals related to the government actions: The espoused goals and the
goals-in-use. The goal-in-use differed from the espoused goals in that they
did not target all the people in need of housing. U.S. aid appears to have
been impartially allocated, but the government focused on allocating bank
loans to mainland migrants in its service.
One of the actions taken by the Committee concerned with in terms of
housing loans was to create ceilings for interest rates and loan-duration.
This action might have been a result of four years of experimentation with
allocation of loans without fixed guidelines. In order to make the process
more efficient, the Committee may have felt the need to ration the task of
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allocating the loans. There is no record of how the clientele were selected.
However, based on my field interviews, it appears that most of the domestic
loans were allocated to central government officials and representatives.
Therefore, as described earlier, the clientele for the bank loans were not
selected on the basis of income level, but on their occupation.
In sum, this period can be seen as a stage of developing guidelines for
allocating the financial resources available for emergency relief of the
housing shortages without having an active financial and organizational
commitment to a broader context of housing policies. Actions were taken
on an ad hoc basis, and the housing organizations were formulated at the
central government level. Since the members of the action team and the
committee were temporary, when the urgent housing needs were solved, the
Committee was disbanded and in 1959 the tasks of public housing were
shifted to the provincial government.
3.2.2 The Decentralized Management Stage: 1959-1975
1959 was a turning point in the evolution of governmental housing
organization. Since the emergency housing problem was considered
relieved, the central government discontinued its role in public housing
administration and shifted the role to the provincial government.
This shift may be viewed as decentralization of housing
administration because the provincial government is considered to be the
"local" government in Taiwan where the three-tier administrative system
consists of the central, the provincial, and the municipal and county
governments.
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However, because there is only one province in Taiwan (Taiwan
Province), and the administrative boundary of the province covers most of
the nation (The Republic of China, which is commonly called Taiwan), the
provincial government is characteristically a devolutionary body of
government instead of a local government. Therefore, this shift should be
understood as a devolutionary decentralization.
In the provincial government, there was neither a housing bureau nor
any housing organizations. The responsibility for public housing
administration was assigned to several different departments of the
provincial government and the overall operational aspects of public
housing were carried out in each county and city government by a Public
Housing Construction Committee. At the provincial level, seven
government organizations were in charge of working on five main aspects of
public housing: management in the Department of Social Affairs;
engineering in the Bureau of Public Works; building materials in the
Supply Bureau and the Forestry Bureau; finance in the Department of
Finance and the Land Bank of Taiwan; land in the Land Bureau.
In 1961, the Public housing Construction Management Act was
established by the provincial government. The Act includes several
important revisions on the scope of public housing, public housing
administrative procedures, financial resources, and mortgage terms. Its
most important provision was to establish a public housing fund by
earmarking 25% of the revenue from the land value increment tax.
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Since 1967, the revenue from the land value increment tax, which was
designed to collect increased value of private land due to public
development activities, was reduced because some revenues were shifted to
the nine-year compulsory education program.
Within the decentralized management stage the pivotal years for
development of housing policy, leading to the centralized planning stage
were from 1968 to 1975. The most significant events, which influenced
discussion of housing problems during these pivotal years, originated
outside as well as inside public housing organizations. Outside forces
came from the political events associated with a new political movement.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, diplomatic setbacks in relations
with the U.S. and Japan set the stage for reform in domestic policies. A
dispute with Japan over administrative rights to the Tiao-yu-tai islets
began in 1968, and Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972 accelerated the
movement for political reform, which had been suppressed by the nationalist
administration led by Chiang kai-Shek.
The movement for political reform became visible when the political
journal Ta-hsheh-tsa-chi was published by Taiwanese intellectuals in 1968,
and a declaration urging political reform was signed by 336 university
professors. These groups aimed at establishing political democracy and
fundamental freedom. The issues raised included youth participation in
politics and university affairs, reelection of representatives at the national
level, and social welfare for workers and the poor. These claims gained
support from young intellectuals and students and inspired massive
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demonstrations against the Chiang kai-Shek's central administration for
several years. But this movement made minimal gains toward achieving its
goals before its virtual disappearance as a political force. However, the
movement brought pressure to bear on the administration and pushed the
premier Chiang Ching-Kuo to prepare to transform his administration
into a "reform administration". Later, by 1975, Chiang Ching-Kuo was able
to portray his administration as a reform administration. As evidence of
reform, he announced a "Ten-point Administrative Reform Program" on
June 9, 1972 and an "Eight-Point political social Reform" in 1973, both of
which focused on changing the behavior of administrative personnel. This
political turbulence and social movement were reflected in the public
housing arena in more concern about low-income families and the homeless.
The central government began to review housing problems and started to
search for solutions at the national level, while the provincial government
remained in charge of housing administration. I will call these pivotal years,
1968 to 1975, the Gestation Period.
During this Gestation period, the central government set up two
organizations to review housing problems: the Urban and Housing
Development Committee to assess urban housing problems and the public
housing Construction Ad hoc Committee to evaluate the problems of public
housing policy.
The two organizations produced a series of reports to recommend new
actions by the central government. The recommendations included: 1)
revision of the Housing Act; 2) linking the public housing plan with the
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economic development plan; and 3) accurate projection of long-term housing
demand.
For the first time, the central government directed a serious effort
toward understanding the housing problem in a broader context and
initiated establishing coherent public housing organizations. These efforts
in reviewing and understanding the housing problems in a fuller context
helped to bring about establishing a housing organization at the central
government level, instead of managing several related departments at the
provincial government level.
During the entire Decentralized Management stage, the financial
resources for public housing totaled NT$ 3,923,499,653.40 ($98.084,991)
which was from the Public Housing Fund. The number of housing units
constructed during this period totaled 131,712 units.
The legacy of this period was establishing committees to review and plan
new strategies and organizations.
During the Gestation Period (1968-1975) these two committees
questioned and reviewed the roots of housing problems beyond the
implementational and management levels and ordinary administrative
performance control. For example, planning concepts, such as the effects
of urbanization on housing, locational factors, market speculation associated
with urban development and renewal may have been brought to bear on the
housing shortage by these two committees.
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In 1975, with the birth of the Six-Year public housing Plan the
devolutionary decentralized management period ended and a centralized
planning period began. Since 1976, public housing policy has been
centrally planned and locally implemented.
3.2.3 The Central Planning Stage: 1976 to the present
In 1976, the Home ownership program was launched and its first plan
was the Six-Year Public Housing Plan. This was the first centrally
formulated long-term housing plan which was incorporated into the overall
on-going Six-Year Economic Plan. The plan's aim was to construct 25,000
units each year for low-income families.
In 1978, at the central level, the Urban Development Department of the
Economic planning Council under the Executive Yuan was reorganized as
the Housing and Urban Development Department. At the provincial level,
the Public Housing Construction Committee was disbanded, and the housing
and Urban Development Bureau was established. At the Taipei municipal
level, the Department of Public Housing, which was reorganized from
the Public Housing Construction Committee in 1975, became responsible
for the tasks of public housing.
These organizational changes reflect the government's notion that
centrally organized bureaus and departments could be more effective than
committees in formulating and implementing a coherent public housing
policy because of their legal power and organized networks.
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Since 1981, the central government has begun to evaluate the
performance of the public housing plan. Discussions, meetings, and
questions raised among the Ministry of the Interior, the Economic
Council, and the Taipei City produced internal evaluation reports which in
turn facilitated thinking about the results of their central planning
efforts. I will call these pivotal years, 1981 to the present, the Evaluation
Period.
During this Evaluation Period, high vacancy rates were considered as a
problem. The problem of a high vacancy rate, 13%, may be the result of
problem solving for housing shortages. The problem of housing shortage was
set during the earlier Gestation Stage and the centrally planned housing
policy was implemented during the Centralized Planning Period.
3.3 Research Strategy
3.3.1 Questions and Variables
In the previous sections of this chapter I have described the research
questions, the hypotheses, the theoretical framework, and the methodology
for this thesis and presented a case study of the public housing process in
Taiwan.
This section discusses specific questions arising from the case study and
my strategy for the field research.
As I explained in the previous chapters, the questions in this chapter are
centered on the issue of how governmental learning can be tested and
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verified. In the second field research, I investigated the two pivotal periods
described in the case study: the gestation (1968-1975) and evaluation (1981-
present) periods. On the basis of previous research, I have identified three
classes of variables: information processing and monitoring capacity; the
process of "raising collective inquiry"; and the policy correcting capacity.
These appear to be relevant in understanding the process of discussions of
the two issues, housing shortages and housing vacancies at the levels of
policy-making and implementation. The purposes of the second field
research was to explore whether governmental learning has occurred in
Taiwan in relation to housing issues; what kind of learning has occurred; to
investigate whether these variables are associated with this learning
process, and further, to clarify the mechanisms by which they affect it.
3.3.2 Information Processing and Monitoring Capacity
To describe the variable of information processing and monitoring
capacity in specific terms, the following questions need to be answered:
" How do governmental organizations get information and stories
concerning difficulties, problems, and limitations, and other data?
How are these stories transmitted from the local to central
governmental levels, from the field to the office, and from the
housing market to the monitoring institution?
* How do such organization monitor information on implementation?
" How do organizations report the process of implementation?
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* Are there any informal measures or tools used at the local level? If
so, what are their purposes?
3.3.3 Process of Raising Collective Inquiry
To obtain valid and reliable measures of this variable, the following
are relevant:
* How do government organizations respond to various indicators or
signals of: consumer response to public housing, governmental
evaluation of public housing policy, social change in general,
theoretical and practical trends in housing policy.
* Are the responses to indicators or signals mentioned above different at
various levels of the governmental housing apparatus?
* How did organizations succeed or fail to raise a collective inquiry?
* What is the boundary of risk and the limitations on or incentives in
raising a collective inquiry?
3.3.4 Policy Correcting Capacity
To determine whether a government has policy correcting capacity, the
following must be answered:
* What is the boundary of control and the limitation on or freedom in
translating the findings into a policy for governmental action?
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" How did a finding of the process of collective inquiry become
transformed into a change in the espoused policy or policy-in-use?
* For what purposes did the government change organizational
structure?
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CHAPTER 4
THE PIVOTAL PERIODS REVISITED:
FROM GESTATION TO EVALUATION
PERIODS
The previous chapter described the scenario of the public housing process
in Taiwan from its independence to the present. In that chapter, we learned
that the public housing process has undergone changes encompassing three
consecutive stages and two pivotal periods in its development.
How can we understand the changes in the evolution of the Taiwanese
public housing process, that is, the changes in pronouncements, legislation,
institutional arrangements, the planning process, and the implementation of
public housing policies in Taiwan?
The changes that have occurred in the housing process are clearly
identified and understood as an evolutionary process. As indicated in
chapter 2, these changes can neither be fully explained by existing theories
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of housing nor by such exploratory theories as fashion theory,personality
theory, political contention theory, and pendulum theory.
In order to understand the changes, we need to know more about the
specific periods which appear to be creative and facilitative of change. In
order to comprehend the forces facilitating change, we should revisit the
Gestation and the Evaluation periods which I have hypothesized as pivotal
for the changes that discussed in Chapter 3.
4.1 A Framework
In order to test whether learning has occurred and what kinds of learning
have been practiced in'the public housing process, we need an integrated
framework which can be employed first to trace the changes over time,
second to interpret the actions taken by organizations that created the
changes, and third to describe and assess the inquiries that initiated and
facilitated actions taken.
4.1.1 Formulating and Testing a Learning Continuum
Accounting for changes includes two processes. One is to formulate a
learning continuum of the public housing process and the other is to test the
learning continuum formulated. Several perspectives and approaches have
guided the development of a framework for formulating and testing the
learning capacity of the public housing process.
I have started with a historical approach (Gardner, 1968), seeking to
show how the change may have evolved by tracing interrelationships among
past, causal antecedents and the current problematic situation. This
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historical approach was used to tease some patterns out of a sequence of
events in the public housing process, because we need bases for interpreting
and inter-relating events otherwise isolated occurrences.
However, I departed from mere description of the sequence of historical
events in my concern with the interpretation of events and particularly the
notion of causal chains of events. Because it is necessary to interpret and
distinguish between latent and active factors of the system in question,
beyond the historically observable traits of changes and events.
After laying out the historical events, I needed to know more about how
this public housing process functions: not the mere description of rank and
file of the bureaucratic branches and laws but analysis of agents and
functions of the process. The systems approach ( Ackoff, 1971 and 1974) was
useful in understanding a system that consists of components that are
dynamically interrelated among one another beyond the structure of the
system. Given this approach, it is necessary to identify agents and the
functions of the agents. I have called the agents as forums which acted as
major institutional vehicles in shaping ideas, decision-making and
implementation of the public housing process.
The next question lies in the forums' interaction among one another, in
terms of creating, processing, and responding to the changes observed. The
search for an answer started with the concept of a self-regulating system
(Deutch, 1963; Beer, 1972; Steinbrenner, 1974), for understanding cycles of
detecting errors, responding to the errors, and reacting to the stages of the
housing process and,as well as to transitional periods of feedback. The self
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regulating system of the public housing process was not assumed as a
"thermostat", but rather was looked at a possibility of "feedback" in the
process of planning, action, and feedback.
The three approaches helped to explain how I have structured the case
history of public housing in Taiwan: 1) the historical approach in laying out
the sequence of events; 2) the general systems approach in understanding
how the agents function to interact to one another; and 3) the self-regulating
systems approach in comprehending the cycles of error-detection. However,
a question remains as to how the theories encompassing the continuum of
public housing process changed beneath the historically observable level of
chains of events. In order to understand factors which mediated and
inhibited creating the different stages and particularly the pivotal periods of
the continuum,it is necessary, first, to analyze and compare what the public
housing system has claimed to do with what the system has actually done, so
as to flesh out the system's actions into the espoused theory and theory-in-
use (Argyris and Schon, 1974). An analysis to distinguish the policies in two
levels, espoused and in-use leads to an understanding of the complicated web
of the actions claimed by the system and the system's actual behavior.
Second, it is important to analyze and to evaluate the characteristics of of the
process of inquiries for "error-detection" and "error-correction." Because it
enables us to reveal the critical catalysts, and/or facilitators,buffers, and
hindrances that have succeeded or failed to mediate the shift from one state
of theory-in-use to the next so as to test and discover the quality of
organizational learning capacity.
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The learning continuum of the public housing process has been mapped
by describing changes in the patterns of action the government has taken
and in the environment of those actions. The description of the evolutionary
process is primarily based on the following six components: (1) the espoused
policies and policy-in-use under which the government and the forums were
operating; (2) the institutional arrangements, including both the
organizational structures and their laws and regulations; (3) the framing of
the problems, including changes in problem-setting and problem-solving and
the interplay between the two, as well as changes in goals and objectives
which set the rationale for actions taken; (4) the behaviors of the
organizations involved, including the interactions and structure of and the
responses from the institutional behavior; (5) the outcome of governmental
actions, including the actual magnitude of public housing production such as
the numbers, location, design, means of distribution, pricing, eligibility
requirements, and management of activities such as expansion and
alteration of housing units; and, (6) the contexts of these events, that is, the
political and socio-economic backgrounds where the government takes its
actions.
4.1.2 Pivotal Periods in the Learning Continuum
I have identified two pivotal periods in the public housing process,
namely the Gestation (1968-1975) and the Evaluation(1982-present) periods.
These periods are bridges that mediate the changes which occurred between
the Decentralized Management Stage(1959-1975) and the Centralized
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Planning Stage (1975-present), and between the Centralized planning Stage
and the future.
In this study, I arranged the public housing process into consecutive
stages and periods by identifying and organizing the similar patterns of
actions, situations, and outcomes. The pattern itself I refer to as the learning
continuum. The importance of laying out the evolution of the continuum
here lies not in dividing a certain reality into classes or patterns but in
characterizing the incoherent and transitional periods between the coherent
stages. Finding incoherence in the pattern of the learning continuum means
finding clues for formulating theories to account for changes. The bridge
periods between the homogeneous stages are pivotal in revealing the nature
and limitations of making an inquiry and of its resolution, which may bring
about different kinds of institutional learning.
4.1.3 Role of Pivotal Periods
As was indicated earlier, the pivotal periods acted as bridges to mediate
the changes and eventually lead to the development of a different stage.
These are the periods of breakdown of a certain continuity or, in Schon's
terms, "zone[s] of instability" ( Sch6n, 1971).
A pivotal period may be the period that reveals changes which accompany
a crisis, chaos, or a silence, indicating that beneath the evolutionary
continuum, there might be a process of success or failure of learning that can
be strengthened and amplified by the conditions of changes that we see in
the historical process.
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Diagram 4.1 The Pivotal Periods in the Public Housing Process
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4.1.4 Forum
The term "forum" in this study refers to a medium for discussion; it is an
institutional vehicle in which individuals can discuss ideas, assess actions
taken and the events that have occurred, and develop strategies for
problem-setting and solving.
The three forums have been identified not only on the basis of the
bureaucratic or professional positions of their members, but also on the basis
of the full range of activities and influences an individual may have in
addition to those designated by his/her official position.
An analysis that uses a forum as a means of explanation has two
principal advantages over conventional approaches which limits themselves
to analysis of officially designated structures and job roles. A forum-based
analysis (1) can depict individual behavior that deviates from espoused roles,
and (2) it can describe intra and inter-organizational linkages that are not
part of the officially recognized channels of communication.
In the Taiwanese public housing process, I have identified three major
forums, namely, the political, the planning, and the operational forums. The
agents of the political forum include high-level politicians who are the core
agents of decision-making. The agents of the planning forum include the
group of planners and planning-related professionals inside and outside the
government, i.e., architects, planners, economists and so on, who are
engaged in planning, generating ideas, and supporting the political forum as
a professional brain pool. The operational forum includes the administrative
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agents of the government, who implement policies. Sometimes, a member of
a particular forum may act outside his/her usual sphere; for example, a
planner may become involved in the political process.
In this study, clarifying how and what discussion was raised, and how the
discussion led to making and changing decisions for the planning and
implementation process is important in order to identify the shifting actions
of the agents orchestrated among different groups.
In order to understand the changes that occurred in the Taiwanese
public housing process, it seems critical to explain how housing projects, as
one of the "construction projects," became politicized and professionalized
phenomena. Because the focus of this research is on testing the institutional
learning hypothesis by analyzing the changes occurred, I have based my
investigation of the changes that occurred in the policy-in-use and the
changes that occurred in the the focuses of the discussion agendas among
and within the forums.
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4.2 The Gestation Period Revisited
In order to understand the Gestation Period, it seems critical to
investigate the political and socio-economic context for what happened
during this period.
4.2.1 The Context: The Political and Socio-Economic Background
The period from 1968 to 1975 included the preparation of Chiang Ching-
Kuo's succession to Chiang Kai-Shek as well as the deterioration in relations
between the R.O.C. and the U.S. The Shanghai Communique of 1972, in
particular, posed new uncertainties for the nation's political future and
raised political debates unprecedented in openness and scope among
intellectuals in Taiwan. However, the change in U.S. policy toward the
People's Republic of China in 1971-1972 tended to strengthen the
conservative nature of the government, eventually making it even more
reluctant then usual to consider risky political reforms. Chiang Ching-Kuo
needed political support and legitimacy for his domestic reform policy. He
also faced the instability triggered by the diplomatic setbacks between
Taiwan and the U.S. and between Taiwan and Japan and the consequences
of these setbacks, such as more open discussion among the different groups of
people in Taiwan about domestic and international policies. The
"Taiwanization" of the government began to accelerate, while the
mainlanders inside Taiwan who held the reins of power struggled to
maintain their political influence. In Taiwan, most of the government
officials were members of the Kuo-Min-Tang, the leading party in power
since the independence.
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Moreover, the external threat of derecognition by the U.S. provided both
groups with a strong motivation for keeping the political process orderly.
Both the government and the opposition led by Taiwanese intellectuals felt
that they would benefit from political stability and continued economic
growth. The parochial conflicts among the groups vying for power in
Taiwan were not the major determinants of Taiwanese policy decisions at the
time. As H.H. Chen comments, "Understanding Taiwan is much beyond the
parochialism most often depicted by some Westerners as the cause of any sort
of situation in Taiwan" (Personal communication, July, 1985). The
pragmatic interests in the smooth operation of the government overrode the
parochialism most often depicted as the major element in understanding
Taiwanese policy. Both the intellectual opposition and the administration,
led largely by mainlanders, altered the substance of policy and emphasis on
particular policies, such as public housing, without changing the basic idea
of the hierarchical institutional authority in which mainlanders were at the
top. Both groups needed more than the high rate of economic growth to show
that the living standard of the R.O.C. indeed far surpassed that of the P.R.C.
and to demonstrate the progress and the commitment the R.O.C. had made.
The socio-economic context for this process lies in the rapid urbanization
which occurred during the '60s. The urbanization ratio increased during this
period (Lin, 1982), showing the pressing migration from rural to urban
areas, which, in turn, increased the demand for housing in urban areas.
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4.2.2 Searching for an Answer
During the Gestation Period, the political and planning forums emerged
as the major institutional vehicles for working on housing issues. The
former group consisted of the political leaders and advisors associated with
Chiang Ching-Kuo; the latter group was composed of the planners in the
universities and the government. The political forum set in motion the
discussion on housing to create a centralized public housing program, while
the planning forum rationalized and justified this discussion by reviewing
the national housing problem in general, and centered its efforts around the
Council for Economic Planning and development (CEPD). The
administrative forum, which could implement the policy at an operational
level, had not yet established itself at this time.
Understanding the positions of and interactions between the political and
planning forums is critical for comprehending the Gestation Period as a
bridge which mediated changes and identified the learning the government
experienced from the interaction. The political forum was going through a
transitional period primarily because Chiang Ching-Kuo was being groomed
to succeed his father, Chiang Kai-Shek, as Premier. Facing a political
setback and needing political support, he geared the political forum toward
preparation of reform policies that would be implemented later. Chiang's
reform policies centered on "clean and honest government that can serve the
people" with emphasis on domestic policies, the improved "livelihood of
people," and centrally "responsible" government (Personal communication,
R. Chang, July 1985).
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The heart of the political forum was the Executive Yuan, headed by
Chiang Ching-Kuo; the Yuan was the focal point for decision-making on
public programs, such as economic development. The Council for Economic
Planning and Development (CEPD) at the Executive Yuan was the planning
forum that transformed the ideas into policies and programs. The political
forum perceived housing as a problematic area, but gained confidence from
the success of the Singaporan public housing program.' "If Singaporans can
do it, so can we." (Interview with Lee, MOI, July,1985)
In 1968, the central government organized a group at the CEPD called
the Urban and Housing Development Committee (UHDC). It consisted of 19
experts, who would review national housing problems. The UHDC was the
core of the planning forum. More than twenty meetings in three years were
devoted primarily to drafting the Public Housing Act, the Architecture Code,
the Architects' Code, the Reference for Site Planning and Design, and
studies on housing loans, and on housing conditions and needs. The CEPD's
"Housing Data" report of 1972, summarized the committee's efforts and tried
to assess the various data on public housing from different departments at
the local level, drawing a picture of housing for the entire nation.
The policy drafting by the political forum and the research and ideas
generated by the planning forum were well orchestrated. For the political
forum, the drafting was a long-awaited effort to integrate different groups in
Taiwan and to demonstrate the government's concern for national housing
issues. For the planning forum, the research was an opportunity to use
members' professional knowledge and skills. The planners who had higher
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education and felt that the field had not been utilized for national level
projects, perceived this as an opportunity to be more involved in decision-
making at the national level, which in turn might elevate them to higher
and more important positions. These two tasks complemented one another
and, as a result, the two forums cooperated in launching a nationwide
program.
4.2.3 The Problem Framed: Housing Shortages
Describing how the problem was framed is important because how the
problem was framed during the Gestation Period has a direct bearing on
what policies resulted. In sum, the housing problem was framed as one of the
"housing shortages" and housing conditions by the planning forum, and the
actions recommended in order to relieve this problem were portrayed as a
tool for "social welfare" by the political forum.
The planning forum's major efforts were to draft the Public Housing Act,
to design a national public housing program, and to justify the policy by
linking the program to the housing problems evaluated by the UHDC. All of
these efforts were synchronized during the Gestation Period.
In order to trace how the housing problem was being framed, we need to
know how the UHDC viewed the housing problem and specifically, how the
problem was framed in terms of "housing shortages." The committee
attempted to show how great the need for new housing was, both in quantity
and quality. they described housing conditions and housing shortages to
support the launching of a public housing program as a logical conclusion.
When the UHDC reviewed the housing problem, it projected housing needs
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by estimating dwelling units required by increases in population and by a
decrease in the number of slum units. The committee included projected
decreases resulting from new public works over a projected 20-year
period(1969-1988). The UHDC arrived at a total number of housing units
needed of about 3 million units (See Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 The Projected Housing Demand (1969 - 1988)
Population Deterio- IllegalPeriod TotalIncrease ration Housing
1969-72 452,100 120,240 30,800 603,140
1973-76 383,700 118,950 30,800 533,450
1977-80 436,200 120,240 30,800 587,240
1981-84 494,500 103,430 30,800 628,730
1985-88 560,400 99,550 30,800 690,750
Total 2,326,900 562,410 154,000 3,043,310
Source: CEPD, Housing Data, 1972.
The UHDC's report did not consider the total number of housing units
constructed yearly. The reasons are, first, housing data had been compiled
in terms of aggregated floor area, i.e., in total number of "ping" ( one ping
equals 3.3 square meters) rather than in individual units 2. Second, the
compiled floor area did not specify in terms of land use. For example, the
record of data starts at a local level when the department of architecture
grants a building permit. The record had been kept of the size of floor area
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for units and aggregated to arrive at the total area of building, which did
not spell out residential use, so that the compiled floor area includes non-
residential floor space.
The report also did not consider the capability of the private sector to add
to the housing stock. One of the officers at the MOI said, "We don't even
know how many construction companies are out there, we can only guess."
As a result, there was a logical leap between projected housing needs and the
public housing plan, perhaps due to lack of data and the fact that different
sections of the report were written by different experts without integrated
efforts.
In fact, the problem of housing shortages might not have been a matter of
aggregate numbers of units but rather of distribution, particularly in the two
major cities, Taipei and Kaoshiung. According to the housing census of 1970,
which was apparently not available for the committee in time for its report,
Taiwan had 2,623,265 units for 2,625,628 households. It is interesting to
compare the census' gap of 2,363 units needed with the UHDC's projected
need of 3,000,000. Borrowing the term "housing supply rate" that has been
used in Taiwan for research and decision-making on housing, the rate
reached 99.9% (data from 1970 census).
Let us turn to the missing parts of picture on the private sector. Nearly
90% of housing stock had been produced by the private sector (data from MOI
and statistics). Obviously, the major force for producing housing units,
particularly as many as the 3,000,000 units projected, would be the private
sector. However, the reputations of some construction companies and
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private developers were "not reliable," particularly for constructing low-
income housing units. In the words of one of the government planners, "They
just hit and run." (Personal communication with Lin, July, 1985). In terms
of industrial production, the building industry had reached the highest point
in 1965. Of the approximately six thousand big and small construction
companies, some might "hit and run" and disappear before completing
construction as soon as they got money from a buyer.
The so called "pre-sale" method whereby a buyer funds the expenses for
construction in advance has been popular among private developers.
Therefore, the planning forum's assessment of its role in constructing low-
income housing units was that companies and developers were ill-equipped
to serve low-income families because of their single-minded desire for profit.
In other words, the planning forum's rationale for the public housing
program was that low-income housing should not become a market niche for
the unreliable private developers; it should be an arena for improvements in
social welfare by a responsible government.
The planners expanded their professional rationale for solving the
problem of housing shortages beyond the shortages. The PHA's supporting
documents depicted the major housing problem not as a simple shortage of
units, but rather as the "inadequate physical condition" and the physical
environment of the existing housing units. The committee viewed housing
conditions in terms of the quality of a housing unit and its environment,
based on the planners' concepts of minimum standards: a toilet, a kitchen,
living space, a separate entry, and decent site facilities such as playground,
market, and school. (MOI,1982)
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The committee's guideline for public housing construction was "to build
standardized units directly built by using a method of concentrated
development." (CEPD, 1972)
Having defined shortages and inadequate condition as housing problems,
the planning forum cited one more problem that might result from these two
problems and that was politically most serious. It was the problem of public
security. Knowing that the political forum was committed to the idea of
launching centralized public housing program,the planning forum seized the
opportunity to persuade the political forum to act promptly. The planners
warned of the serious danger of leaving the housing problem unattacked and
unsolved. In the words of the committee for the Public Housing Act, the
rationale was stated as follows:
The housing situation should be improved before poor
housing conditions and housing shortages create social unrest
while Taiwan is still going through a civil war with the
expectation of recovering the Mainland. (CEPD,1972:
Translated)
However, the major programs were not necessarily priorities in the
government budget. The programs represented what the government felt
was a "responsible" response. According to the basic political philosophy
called the "San-Min-Ju-Yi" (SMJY consists of the Taiwanese mixture of
Confucianism and modern democracy that focuses on the responsibilities of a
government; it is the foundation of all the policies in Taiwan. The
government has a "duty" to provide shelter for every citizen. (Note: In the
Chinese language, "public housing" literally means "citizen's housing.")
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4.2.4 The Birth of Public Housing Act of 1975
The preparatory efforts of the Gestation Period culminated in the
promulgation of the Public Housing Act of 1975. The Act, consisting of 45
articles, has been the basis for planning and implementation of the public
housing program. It provides guidelines for eligibility, housing standards,
land acquisition, price, and loans upon which the organizations involved in
public housing, including the EY, the MOI, the CEPD, the MOF, and the
local governments operated.
4.2.4.1 Eligibility
The Act of 1975 identifies as clients "low-income families" (Article 2),
while the introduction of the act added "families of servicemen, government
employees, and teaching personnel." (MOI, 1975 and 1982: 91)
The income level required to apply for public housing was not specified at
the beginning but later on in the Centralized Planning Stage (see next
section). Eligibility was a question throughout the implementation process
because of the difference between the espoused policy -- " housing for low-
income families"-- and the actual policy -- housing for middle-income
families, and military personnel.
4.2.4.2 Land
Article 9 specifies rights and procedures for housing agencies to acquire
land for public housing. The article seemed quite powerful because it gave
legal power to housing agencies to override the Land Law, which specifies
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the basic rights on land and transactional procedures. Article 9 is in conflict
with Articles 104 and 107 of the Land Law over purchasing rights. The Land
Law specifies:
When property or land is sold, the owner of the land, or tenant has
the priority right to purchase the site. (Land Law, Article 104:
Translated)
When farm-land is sold, the tenant or renter has the priority right
to buy or mortgage the land. (Land Law, Article 107: Translated)
Articles 9 and 10 of the Public Housing Act state:
If public land is suitable for public housing, the land shall be sold,
preferably to the housing agency. (Article 9: Translated)
Adjacent land shall be consolidated ... by the agency. (Article 9)
To build public housing, the government may designate an
appropriate area as the site for public housing and complete zone
condemnation. The area of the site shall be decided by the local
public housing agencies and reported to the Executive Yuan for
approval. Upon approval of the condemnation of land, the local
government shall announce the condemnation for 30 days and
notify landowners. The announcement may be made to forbid
transfer of ownership, division, mortgage, new or additional
construction, or change of terrain within the area. (Article 10:
Translated from Chinese)
The changes by the Public Housing Act in land ownership and in the
rights to purchase land can be shifted to the public housing agency by giving
priority in the right to purchase land. This was done to ease the difficulty in
land acquisition of private land.
4.2.4.3 Prices and Loans
Article 16 specifies the price of and loans for public housing.
The price of the public housing units should be lower than the cost
and in reference to the market price of nearby property. Loans
71
should last no less than 15 years and be not less than 70 % of the
price. (Article 16: Translated from Chinese)
Claiming that public housing is for the low-income family, the price
should be lower than the cost, a provision that obviously shows the program
was intended not for profitization, but to increase the distribution of
affordable housing stock. The loan condition sets the unusual financial help,
unlike most of the private home buyers that put up cash without loans from
banks.
4.2.4.4 Management
Articles 18 and 21 state the sources of funds for management and
describes the inappropriate use of housing units after a family moves in.
According to Article 18, the fund for management has three sources: 1) 2.5 %
of the sales of housing and its interest, 2)maintenance fees collected from
residents, and 3) public housing funds.
In the management of the usage of the housing units, Article 21 specifies
the following seven conditions whereby "the public housing agency may
recapture a house and the land it is on": 1) illegal use of the house; 2) failure
to pay principal and interest on the loan for three months; 3) sale, pledge,
mortgage, grant, or exchange without an agreement with the public housing
agency; 4)purchase by members of one family of more than one public
housing unit;5) change to non-residential use; 6) failure to move in within 3
months after purchase; and 7) failure to pay the management fee for 6
months (summarized from article 21). Articles 22 and 23 detail the "illegal
use" referred to in Article 21.
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In case of "expansion, alteration, partition, or other changes that affect
safety, health, landscape, or tranquility of the community,"the housing unit
should be restored to its original state within a given time limit. If
restoration does not occur, the public housing agency shall do the
restoration, but the expenses shall be paid by the residents. In the event
residents refuse to pay for restoration, the housing unit will be recaptured by
the public housing agency (Articles 22, 23).
The government during the Gestation Period viewed public housing as a
standardized shelter distributed to "low-income" families, according to the
Act of 1975. In other words, "distributing" the well-designed dwelling units
to low-income families seemed to be a way to achieve social welfare.
Focusing on the notion that housing is a shelter, the PHA did not see
some other important aspects of housing as tool for investment, turf, social
status, and for production. Another error was that housing construction was
not closely integrated with other related plans such as the regional plan, and
the transportation plan; rather, it was an independent sector unto itself.
Consequently, the planners' professionalism and politicians' zeal for "good"
programs were channeled toward producing standardized housing units.
4.2.4.5 The Public Housing Program
The issue of public housing received high priority and was shaped into the
public housing program, one of the ten major programs among the National
Economic Plans of the new administration led by Chiang Ching-Kuo; it was
declared a "social welfare" program (Housing Act 1975, Article 1).
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On July 15, 1975, the Public Housing Act was promulgated and the"6
Year Public Housing Plan" was launched. The organizational structure for
implementation of the program was rearranged and created as a
streamlined, centralized public housing organization centered on the
Department of Public Housing, MOL. The previously decentralized and
scattered public housing administration was changed to a centralized
administration to implement the newly designed national public housing
plan based on the Public Housing Act of 1975. At the central level, the
committees which had dealt with public housing issues were reorganized
into public housing departments. At the provincial and local levels, the
public housing departments and the housing and urban development
bureaus were created and expanded.
The "Six-Year Public Housing Plan" was designed to be implemented by
the centralized housing administration. The essence of the program was the
construction of public housing units for low-income families. The important
goal was translated into building the number of housing units shown in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2 The Public Housing Plan
Year No. of Units
1976 10,114
1977 10,114
1978 13,118
1979 25,000
1980 25,000
1981 25,000
Total
Source: Kuo, Report on
1981
Public Housing,
75
4.3 The Centralized Planning Stage Revisited
The legacy of the Gestation Period was the birth of the public housing
program. It was based on the Public Housing Act of 1975, which had set the
basic guidelines for the planning and administrative forums during the
Centralized Planning Stage.
In this section, I will describe how the Act was translated into policies
characterized by centralized planning and decentralized implementation.
My purpose is to examine the process of the changes in policies, the responses
to the changes, and the discussion of the problems that arose. The focus of
the examination will be on how the planning forum interacted with the
political and operational forums. In the summer of 1985, I had the
opportunity to participate with the Taiwanese planners in the nationwide
"evaluation trip" for public housing. Moreover, I believe it is more within
the scope of this study to examine the. changes of the planning forum's
behavior.
4.3.1 The Orchestration
The Executive Yuan (EY), the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Council for Economic Planning and
Development (CEPD) are the four major agencies responsible for the public
housing program. The EY has been in charge insofar as it makes and
approves the decisions; the MOI operates the programs by planning and
supervising implementation of public housing projects by the local agencies;
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the MOF sets conditions for housing loans; and the CEPD develops policy
proposals.
Since July 1975, the administrative forum, staffed by planners, was the
major group responsible for implementing the public housing program. To
understand this implementation process, we must comprehend (1) how the
planners approached public housing, (2) what problems their approach
created, and (3) how the planners responded to those problems. We will be
able to see a particular kind of institutional learning that took place in
Taiwan.
4.3.2 Technical Problem-Solving
4.3.2.1 The Planners
The planners fall into three categories: government planners, academic
planners (either in universities or in research institutions), and the
consultants. The backgrounds of the planners vary, yet most have
experience in architecture, civil engineering, economics, geography, and
sociology. The planners and architects hired or contracted by the local
governments to design the public housing sites were led mostly by the
planners and architects at the central level: i.e., middle-aged planners and
architects who had been educated in Taiwan or abroad (usually either in the
U.S. or in Japan) as well as a group of locally trained planners, architects,
and graduate students.
The following section describes some of the ideas the planners and
architects had about their roles in designing public housing. One of
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Taiwan's famous architects Li advocated designing public housing that
symbolized the traditional Chinese pattern of design. Li designed the DaAn
apartment project ; his design for the exterior of the apartment buildings
incorporated the stylistic element of Chinese curves instead of straight
vertical and horizontal lines.(Interview with R. Chang: July 13, 1985)
One of the planners in the provincial government, who wished to remain
anonymous, observed: "You can really design something good if you make it
a new town project; otherwise, you can't do anything modern or stylish."
(Interview: August 5, 1985.) One of the planners in the central government
MOI stated: "Public housing means housing units for low-income groups, by
the government, and with some standardized quality." (Interview with I.
Lin, July 10, 1985)
Public housing meant physical shelter provided by the government. In
other words, planners saw themselves as pioneers in initiating new
architectural designs. They felt they were charged with the task of
improving the physical living conditions of low-income families with
financial and institutional help from the government. Therefore, public
housing, which had been politicized by the political forum during the
Gestation period, now was professionalized by the planners and architects
during the Centralized Planning Stage.
4.3.2.2 Fashionable Concepts
Being concerned with "standardization" and "good quality," the planners
focused most of their effort on how to design the public housing sites. Many
planners and architects wanted to use the "super-block" concept in public
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housing design. Such planners had already been disappointed because
many of the existing apartments had not been built according to the super-
block concept and because the apartment sites did not have enough open
space for greenery and playgrounds.
These planners not only shared a super-block concept; they also agreed
that the exteriors of apartment buildings should be designed without
"obstructive" and "ugly" iron bars attached to the windows. The layout of an
apartment followed the Western concept of a two-bedroom apartment: 2
small bedrooms, a small bathroom, a small kitchen, a big living room, and
no working or receiving space.
Residential and commercial sites were clearly marked on the land use
plan. As a result, the public housing apartment buildings were tall: 7, 9, 12,
or 19 stories, for instance, with playgrounds, greens, and separate
commercial areas.
The "super-block" concept seemed to be a way of maximizing land use
and including playgrounds and greenery in the neighborhoods.
Standardization of the units would save time and expense. For example,
Taipei city designed 2,444 standardized units at the Cheng-Kung project
with the following floor sizes: 20 ping (note, 1 ping= 3.3 square meters), 24
ping, 26 ping, 28 ping, 30 ping, and 34 ping. The Da-An project had 5 types
of layouts for 1,296 housing units: 24 ping, 26 ping, 28 ping, 30 ping, and 34
ping. (Figure 4.6 ) Once the planners, in the government and outside it,
completed the design and planning, the local governments contracted private
construction companies to build the housing units. With the stated purpose
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Figure 4.1 A Prototype: Da-An Public Housing Site
Source: The Public Housing Report, Taipei City, 1981, p.15.
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of improving construction techniques and producing good quality housing,
(Ibid, p 15) the government usually contracted big companies. Taipei city
spelled out their rationale behind contracting big, established companies as
follows:
Most buildings built were high-rises, which need longer
construction time and better equipment. Only first class
construction companies which have sufficient experience and
financial capacity could win a bid.
It is interesting to find out that the planners' notions of super-block, new
town, and standardization seemed to be carried out smoothly by large-scale
companies. It also seemed that the ethical integrity of the large-scale
companies was trusted by the planners more than that of small-scale
companies: The large companies are trusted not to "hit and run"; they are
trusted to "build and stay" for another contract.
4.3.2.3 The Results: What Planners Created
The public housing system orchestrated by the four major agencies (CEDP,
MOL, MOF, EY) constructed 94,084 housing units, one-twentieth of the
number of the housing units constructed by the private sector between 1976
and 1982. In 1978, the MOF improved the conditions for housing loans. The
ban on housing loans to construction companies was lifted, and the
companies were allowed a maximum of 40% of the housing cost. All these
decision were made and approved by the EY.
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The "super-block" concept favored by the planners demanded purchases of
large tracks of land for housing projects, which in turn, added more
constraints to the already difficult task of acquiring land for public housing.
Designing large-scale projects instead of small-scale pilot projects made it
impossible to learn without paying extremely high prices for errord in
design, pricing, and evaluation.
4.3.2.4 The Residents' Responses
Western designs did not readily accommodate to the Chinese way of life
and, thus, became an inconvenience for residents. Residents, for example,
hung their laundry to dry on playground equipment and balconies because
the housing reflected the condition of a typical American apartment
building with clothes driers.
Design flaws and limitations became obvious when residents began to
live in the public housing buildings. Residents enlarged balconies and
illegally enlarged and attached iron-bars to the windows and the front doors
of their apartments. Garbage storage facilities were non-existent and each
household had to carry it in the elevators to the outside of the building.
At a broader level, the public housing program did not consider mixed
land use--- residential and commercial--- with flexible subdivision of housing
units. People were accustomed to using their housing for commercial
purposes. For example, it is quite common in Taiwan for residents to own
and manage shops such as variety and food stores in the same building in
which they live. When a ground-floor space was used for residency only, the
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occupants of the building viewed the situation as a "sin." To the building's
residents, the opportunity cost of ground-floor space for residential purposes
was very high. Using the first floor of the public housing apartment
building for purposes other than commercial ones was viewed as a "sin" by
the middle and lower-income families I interviewed. (Interviews, summer of
1985)
This consideration was strong enough to deter some people from applying
for public housing. When one of the low-income families was asked why
they had not applied for a public housing unit, they replied that they "could
not attract customers." (Interview of the Hsieh family in July, 1985) The
family practised the rituals of Taoism daily; their Taoism and commercial
activities- - selling the ritual red-inked papers and ritual services - - required
access to customers.
While residents understood housing as production infrastructure, the
planners in Taiwan perceived it simply as a physical shelter.
4.3.2.5 The Planners' Response
The failure to adapt Western design to the Chinese way of living created
an inconvenience for residents in their everyday life. As mentioned earlier,
residents, for example, hung their laundry to dry on playground equipment
and balconies. The "chaotic use of space and equipment by the residents was
seen as a disappointment by the planners. The planners' diagnosis of these
problems was "a lack of proper management and a lack of education."
(Interviews in '84 and '85)
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These problems of the chaotic use of space were not seen as often in the
military sites because they were watched for "violations" and more
importantly because they had more space. Perhaps most important of all,
when the planners worked on military sites, they altered the design based on
what the residents wanted; for instance, they built units of 34 ping instead
of 24 ping per unit and attached iron-bars to the windows.
As memo #2750 from the MOI to local agencies on November 2, 1979
indicated it was acceptable to have temporary removable iron bars on top
of the flat roof, according to article 2 of the Architecture Law. However, in
the regulation for the design of public housing, article 56 clearly states that
there can be no iron bars on top of public housing roofs and open space.
(MOI memo # 2750, November2, 1979, Article 2 of the Architecture Law,
article 56 of public housing) In other words, public housing required tougher
regulation in design than general housing. Specifically concerning illegal
expansion, the MOI delegated authority to the local housing agency with a
general mandate to be tough on it.
Any alteration, expansion, or repair after completion of public
housing should be applied for to the local housing agency with
specified drawing for approval. (MOI memo #828625, Jan 25,
1979: translated. )
In fact, much illegal expansion, particularly drying areas and iron bars
attached to windows and expanded space, was plainly visible when I visited
housing sites in 1984 and 1985. In spite of the strong words in the Public
Housing Act concerning illegal expansion and repossessing housing that
was altered ellegally and the tough guidelines from MOI, the local agencies
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dealt with this matter quite interestingly. Each site had management staffs
collecting fees and maintaining the site. The staffs made a record of who
expanded what. However, this record was kept by the management and was
not followed by legal action of recapture. One staff person put it this way:
"As long as you do what others are doing, there is no way that you can be
punished." (Interview with K. Liu in July 5, Shinju county 1985)
4.3.2.6 What the planners overlooked
The concept of metropolitan planning was not carefully reviewed and
implemented. A commuting time of one hour was not popular in Taipei,
unlike Seoul and Tokyo. Other infrastructure, such as , the public
transportation system, was not reviewed along with the public housing
program. Housing was seen as "physical gift" by the government planners
in Taiwan but the "gift" was not accepted by the people. The example of
vacant housing units--- to the extent of one unit sold out of hundreds of
units--- observed during the evaluation trip was mostly outside of the
outside of Taipei city, but within the Metropolitan area, particularly
Taoyuen Hsien. The design ideas of planners and the constraints on land
created high-rise apartment buildings and a lack of concern for location.
These factors contributed to vacancy rates. The high vacancy rates were
further elevated by the fact that the public housing units were not
convenient to live in for most of the residents. The problem of acquiring land
was increased by the criteria of building 100 or more units in one block.
4.3.2.7 Administration of Public Housing Policy and Implementation
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The top-down inquiry by the political forum to solve the problem
formulate as "shortages" was shaped into building high-rise apartment
buildings by the planning forum using the Western model for building
design. The solution to such problems as constraints on land purchase and
use, "green space", and "floor area ratio" - - the actual implementation of the
policy- - was left to the administrative forum in the streamlined form of the
public housing agencies, namely the public housing departments at the
central and the local levels.
4.3.3 The Obstacle: Land
Purchasing land so that targeted production numbers could be reached
became the most critical barrier to the implementation of the public housing
program. The reasons are the following:
* Land is a scarce resource in Taiwan to begin with;
" The housing program had to compete for available land with the city
and industrial needs, such as commercial or industrial use of a
particular land;
* Changes in city planning were not synchronized with land for public
housing and did not adequately reflect the need for land for public
housing;
* The Housing Act of 1975 specified that a site had to be bigger than .2
ha to be considered as public housing site; and
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* The adoption of a super block concept by the planners and architects
prompted the housing agencies to look for bigger sites.
Even after finding land for public housing, acquiring it was another
problem. In the case of the Shin-Kang community in Taichong county, the
community would not allow land belonging to the community to be used for
public housing by the county government. The county's housing agency
asked MOI how to deal with this problem. MOI's response was:
Article 5 of the public housing act clearly spells out the priority
usage of public land for public housing. The limitation specified
in the Land Law does not apply to this case. Even the Land Law
is applied to this case, article 4 of the Land Law spells out that
land belonging to the community is considered public land. In
any case, the land belonging to Shin-Kang community should be
used for public housing. This is an operational problem [rather
than a legal problem]. Therefore, the county should find a way to
persuade and negotiate with the community. (Translated. from
MOI internal memo, #783195, May 19, 1978)
The espoused policy of giving priority to land use for public housing did not
solve problems in acquiring land. Particularly, when there was competition
for land from other uses, such as industrial use, deciding how the land would
be used became more than a problem of interpretation of the Pubic Housing
Act or city planning law or the land law. In fact, in some cases, after land
was purchased for public housing, the city land use plan had changed the use
of a particular parcel of land from residential to industrial use and the land
had to be sold back (MOI memo 777811, April 10, 1978). Therefore, the
problem of acquiring land became a critical one that the local housing
agencies could not solve easily.
4.3.4 The Solution: Joint Venture
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Obtaining land became the critical factor in getting public housing built
and was perceived as a problem beyond that which a local housing agency
could solve. Although the PHA specified the priority in getting land for
public housing, it was beyond the housing agency's capacity and its political
power. As a result, the responsibility for obtaining land shifted from the
housing agencies to the mayors and Hsien (County) leaders. When it
became obvious that they were "not achieving the goal" (CEPD, 1982), the
heads of the local governments plunged into the work of getting land for
public housing. For example, mayor Teung-hue Lee of Taipei found a way: a
"joint venture " with the Department of Defense.
Mayor Lee Teng-Huey and Minister Kao Kuei-yuan agreed to launch a
project called "redevelopment of the military dependents' village."
(Interview with R. Chang, July 1985) The photos in the government report
of the project show minister Kao, general Soong Chang-chi, General Cheng
Wei-yuan, and Mayor Lee, inspecting a model of the site and visiting a
military site as a public housing project in 1981.
The joint venture concept had not been created by Mayor Lee. In fact,
it had been practiced by the private sector in a very similar way. Often, if a
private developer could not find land, he developed housing with a
landowner. For example, Mr. Cheng owned a four-story building. The
developer Hsieh joined him, and they expanded the building to six stories.
Upon completion of the building, Cheng owns up to the fourth floor and the
developer Hsieh owns the fifth and the sixth. (Interview with S. Cheng: July
8,1985)
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In the joint venture between Taipei City and the DOD, the DOD offered a
military site and the local housing agency redeveloped it. Throughout 1981,
39 military villages out of 178 in Taipei were redeveloped as public housing
projects. (Data from Kuo, 1982) As a result of the joint venture, the
problem of land acquisition was eased and the city contracted 11,365 units
for public housing, which was 49.4% of the total target of the six-year
program in one year, 1981. Examples of the joint venture projects were the
Chu-Kuang and Cheng-kung projects.
4.3.5 The Role of Planners in the Joint Venture.
Having solved the problem of acquiring land by joint ventures with the
DOD, the planners' work was to redevelop military villages. Unlike other
projects, the planners faced a challenge from the residents. For instance, the
residents challenged the design, size, and even the prices of the units.
Compared to other public housing projects, the joint venture projects had
uniquely vocal residents and added more constraints in the design, size, and
prices of units.
As a result, the housing agencies violated the regulations of the Public
Housing Act of 1975 and the planners' notion of "good " design for low-
income families in the following ways:
* The size of a unit changed from 12, 16, 20, 24, 28 to 24, 26, 30, and 34
pings. (one ping is equal to 3.3 square meters)
* Iron-bars, considered "slummy," "ugly," and "unsophysticated" by
planners and architects, were attached to the windows at some sites.
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* Housing quality was up-scaled by using more expensive materials
such as better tiles and wall papers. (Note: Tien-tai Chang, then the
Director of Housing Dept. of Taipei wrote in 1981 that "The housing
quality has improved." (The Housing Report of Taipei City, 1981, p.4:
underline is mine).
* The clients for public housing became mostly military personnel--
retired or employed.
These changes are important: a change in size clearly violated the PHA
regulation concerning the size of a unit, which specified" that it "should not
exceed 28 ping." The regulation was revised to accomodate the changes.
(revised PHA, 1982. )
Changes in exterior design were made primarily because of concerns
regarding security, the practical extension of space, better quality material.
All of these measures would raise the cost, which in turn would raise the
price of unit. Most importantly, the change in the target group from the low-
income group to the middle-income group was a violation of the original
intention of the planning and political forums.
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4.4 The Evaluation Period Revisited
4.4.1 Asynchronized Transition
The public housing program was being carried out with a goal-driven
strategy in a resource-limited environment. The game was focused on
building housing units to achieve the target numbers while coping with lack
of land.
Taipei City set a successful example for other local governments in
achieving the target. On July 27, 1981, the premier of the Executive Yuan,
visited Taipei City and commented:
The achievements of the housing program has been the best work
completed by the Taipei city government
Mayor Teung-hei Lee explained and interpreted the premier's comments
on July 29, 1981 at the internal review meeting of public housing at the
Department of Housing as:
He [The premier] noticed that the accomplishments far exceeded those in
other cities. The mayor went on to advertise the success story in other
communities. On August 10, 1981 at the conference on urban management,
he made a speech to an audience of mostly college professors:
In the past few years, the development of housing in Taipei has
rapidly advanced. We had a serious problem in land acquisition.
However, the city government has made very rapid progress in
housing construction. This progress can be explained as
reflecting the determination of a city government and the
effective setting of strategies for managing housing problem in a
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city. (Quoted and translated from p.3 of report on public housing,
Department. of Housing of Taipei City, 1981)
4.4.2 The Shift
The transitional event that brought about reformulation of the housing
problem revolved around the national report on public housing presented
on August 19, 1981 to the president as an evaluation report of the public
housing program.
The discussion among the political, planning, and operational forums on
this report is transitional because, first it summarized what had been done to
implement public housing plan the forums had formulated, agreed, and
espoused to do; second, this report revealed the differences among the three
forums in the way they identified problems.
The report was prepared by the planners at the provincial government
and was presented by the governor of Taiwan province, Kuo. The following
is a brief description of the contents of the report and of the discussion among
members of the planning forum in response to the report. This description
reveals how some information was treated within the planning forum and
how they inhibited its communication to other forums.
The report evaluates the public housing program and suggests the
program's future directions. The main points of the report includes
describing types of dwelling units in size, - - 12, 16, 24, 28 ping - -,
constructed by the work of 1,103 personnels of public housing organizations;
central 11; province 1,690; Taipei city 58; and the other cities and counties
181.
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More importantly, the evaluation of the implementation of public
housing compares the local cities and counties from 1976-1981 (note:
38,268,000 units were produced.). Taipei City achieved the highest
implementation rate 104,32%, 23,944 units constructed out of 23,000 units
planned; and Kaoshiung City accomplished the second highest result,
82.04%, 9,930 units out of 12,104 units planned; and Taipei county produced
the lowest rate, 16.92 %, 988 units (16.92%) out of 5792 units planned.
A number of points need to be made here. The national report in 1981
appears to be consistent with what the program was set up to do, yet it did
not include any problems detected or discussed by the planning forum. In
terms of evaluating the performance of local governments, the criteria were
kept consistent as to what was specified as a goal: building, more. In
addition, the report was very general and the data were incomplete.
Moreover, the standardized sizes of the units were reported as 12, 16, 20, 24,
and 28 ping. In fact, units of 30 and 34 ping were built for the military sites.
Moreover, the abstraction of numbers under general titles was misleading
and did not convey a precise picture of what had been implemented and how
implementation was carried out.
In fact, some planners at CEPD, MOI were aware of the surprising
vacancy rate, 12.8%, from the national housing census in 1980 and the fact
that the local governments had been having hard time selling what they
had built.
The high vacancy rates in the private housing stock and the new
problem of sales of public housing were known to the planning forum. They
93
were confused by the two sets of information, yet the planners kept the
confusion within themselves. The reason might have lain in the fact that
the political forum has authority over the planning forum and the life of the
public housing program. Therefore, it was particularly difficult for the
planning forum to communicate across the forum. Within the planning
forum, however, the information flow was rapid, partially because the
planners know each other very well through informal gatherings such as
playing tennis or having lunch or dinner. Chen described the informal
network among the planners as being " just a phone call away." (Interview
in June, 1985)
The planners have been selected through entrance exams for schools and
public positions and educated and trained domestic or abroad. They have
connections based on school or work places. Particularly, the CEPD has
been an institution where most of the key planners at the local or central
government levels have worked before. Most of the politicians, however,
have quite different networks from the planners'. Therefore, bringing up
confusion or problems was not an easy job between the two forums.
Although the change of focus from producing public housing units to
selling and managing the vacant units was well received in the planning
forum, this change was not understood by the political forum. Both the
planning and political forums had created the objective of producing public
housing units during the Gestation Period (1968-1975). The political forum
had not been exposed to the vacancy data and the planning forum's initial
interpretation of them, so that when the national public housing report was
presented to the President in 1981, the attention was still on the production
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of public housing units and vacancies were not identified as an important
problem.
4.4.3 The Central and Local Governments
During the Centralized Planning Stage, the three-tiered housing
agencies -- central, provincial, and local-- implemented the public housing
programs. Despite the difficulty of acquiring land, the public housing
agencies produced 58% of the units they planned to produce. In 1980 and
1981, the local housing agencies began to find that public housing units were
not being sold very well. When the central housing agency learned of the
inadequate sales, their initial response was to describe the situation as a
motivation problem. The central agency felt that the local agencies were not
working hard to sell the public housing units, because "the public housing
program was not their private business" (Interview with Mr. Lee and Fong
CEDP, July, 1985).
The different focuses of the questions asked by the central and local
governments reflect the differences in the ways they were thinking about
and responding to the difficulties and problems. The changes in their focuses
reflect their issues and their agendas for problem-setting, which in turn
characterize their solutions to the problems identified. The central
government's questions were initially focused on checking what they
thought to be "irresponsible" and "lazy" performance or ineptitude by the
local governments. These questions are based on their perspective on
implementation of the public housing program as a "control" mechanism
through which their original plans are to be implemented in a streamlined
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fashion. Their evaluation of the local governments' performance may be an
attempt to locate responsibility for the unexpected results from the public
housing programs.
The local governments, on the other hand, raised questions concerning
ways of getting the identified problem solved. For instance, how can we sell
more? Since the attention of the central government had been shifted from
production to sales, the local governments were thinking and responding to
the newly discovered objective of the program in terms of how to solve the
sales problem. The way the local government perceived the implementation
of the public program was based on their view that the implementation of
the program was a faithful translation of the policy the central government
had designed. The local government focused on the goals that they were
asked to achieve.
The evaluation period (1982-present) began with an increasingly
disappointing public housing sales record and a high vacancy rate(12.8%) for
housing in general indicated by the 1980 census. The following is the series
of questions that were addressed during the Evaluation Period. These
questions became increasingly more general over time and eventually
involved the fundamental issues of housing policy: "Why aren't the houses
selling well? What went wrong? How can we sell more? What's going on in
the market? What is our housing problem? Do we need public housing?"
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4.4.4 The Vacancy Problem Framed
Despite the efforts to increase the sales of the units by the local agencies
through more active advertising including commercials on TVs, the
vacancies seemed to continue throughout most of the counties and cities.
When the Housing Census of 1980 (which was published in June 1982)
showed a nationwide housing vacancy rate of 12.8%, both the central and
local public housing agencies responded that "the vacancies not only the
problem of the public housing sector" (Interview with I-Ho Lin, MOI).
Although the public housing program was operated within the government's
administrative boundaries and the eligibility for application for the public
housing units was defined, when the public housing units were put onto the
market for distribution, their sale was beyond the control of the public
housing agencies. These agencies began to realize a need to balance supply
and demand and the marketability of the units as well as to maintain the
original design of the public housing policy. The notion of the public housing
program as a tool for "social welfare," which is specified in the Public
Housing Act of 1975, began to shift its actual meaning. The housing
agencies began to realize that public housing would have to compete with the
private sector, as well; and the clients began to see public housing to be, like
private housing, an opportunity for investment in real estate. Therefore, in
terms of housing sales, the line between the public and private sectors began
to be less distinguishable.
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The public housing agencies realized that they had a new problem,
"vacancy." Framing the problem as "housing vacancies" was not simply an
escape from the responsibilities for the unexpected low sales of the public
housing units. The term was also a reflection of the awareness developed
during program implementation, which zeroed in on the inescapable reality
of public housing as a part of the whole housing and economic system to
begin with. This awareness also encompassed the fact that housing was
interconnected with other infrastructures such as transportation, and with
higher level plans such as the regional plans. The housing agencies,
particularly the central agency, began to believe that: 1) the public housing
was part of the whole housing system and, as one kind of housing unit
available to home-buyers, was affected by market forces that resulted in a
low rate of housing sales in general; 2) planning and implementation of
public housing programs needed to be linked with the dynamics of related
factors influencing decisions made by home-buyers. For example, a home-
buyer first would compare possible housing units, both public and private
ones, and decide among them. Second, a buyer would make an investment
decision beyond a purchasing decision to buy a physical shelter for their
family.
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4.4.5 The Responses to Vacancy
The central housing agency suggested stoppage of building housing
units, but the local government did not stop building. The local planners
were squeezed between the central planners and the mayors and governors:
the central planners tried to manage the public housing program by
producing less, but the local politicians managed the overall image of the
local government by producing new public housing units. The number of
housing units owned by a prospective buyer was no longer a sales criterion;
prices were cut by reducing the work on the environment of the public
housing sites, for example, by eliminating features such as playgrounds and
trees.
4.4.6 The Results
In spite of the decision to decrease the number of planned and modified
housing units starting in 1982, the number of newly-built public housing
units increased yearly up to 1985. The reasons for this increase were: (1)
The process was not monitored after the implementation of the old directives
had begun and the momentum of the building process was increased by the
expansion of the established public housing organization, in which there
were 1,000 government employees working in 1982. (2) It took two to three
years from the announcement of construction to the completion of public
housing units. However, the central government seemed to recognize that
despite their newly planned goal of reducing the number of units, that there
was a surplus of housing . The primary evaluation criterion set by the
central government for the local governments changed from building more to
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selling more. The case of Taipei Hsien was a good example. It used to be one
of the worst performers among the public housing agencies, but it became
one of the best agencies, because the evaluation criterion changed. They
were good at selling the little they had built.
4.4.7 The Discussion Opened
The following is the series of questions that were addressed during the
evaluation period. These questions became increasingly more general over
time and eventually evolved as the fundamental issues of housing policy:
Why aren't the houses selling well? What went wrong? How can we sell
more? What's going on in the market? what is our housing problem? Do we
need public housing?
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NOTES
1. Singaporan public housing started in the early 60's and was carried out
mainly by the Housing Development Board. In the early 60's, the emphasis
of their policy was "to provide flats as cheaply as possible at maximum
density acceptable socially." (Thai-ker Liu, Public Housing Policy in
Singapore, 1982: 25) Bukit Ho Sweee and Queens town are examples of
public housing projects.
In the late 60's, neighborhood development was experimented with on
satellite towns, i.e., Toa Payoh new town. In the early 70's, design guidelines
and planning standards were formulated. Ang Mo Kio and, Bedokand
Clementi are examples of satellite towns. Singaporan public housing has
evolved from building low-cost flats (1960-65), to neighborhood development
(1966-70), to new towns with design guidelines (1971-75), to precinct-based
development (1976-80), and to community development (1980's).
2. The statistics compiled by the Council for Economic Planning and
Development, 1984, show the following:
i) That the number of residential units constructed was "estimated by
the MOI." from the building permits and permits for non-residential
buildings, which were compiled in floor area (unit: ping) not in
individual unit numbers.
ii) The total floor area for "residential" units had been "estimated since
1981."
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CHAPTER 5
INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
As illustrated in the earlier chapters of this dissertation, the Taiwanese
public housing process has undergone changes. This chapter explains how
we can understand the changes in the context of institutional learning.
First, I will recapitulate the Taiwanese Public Housing Process, emphasizing
the mismatch or gap between the goals of the policy and the results; second,
in order to explain this mismatch, I will present a model of institutional
learning in the Taiwanese Public Housing Process.
The global problem shifted from housing shortages to housing vacancies;
the program began with the intention of inspiring and leading the private
sector and ended up imitating the private sector; the program originated for
the purpose of sheltering the poor and low-income families but ended up by
serving middle-income groups.
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5.1 The Dialogues
In order to explain these shifts in reference to institutional learning, we
need to analyze the characteristics of dialogues within and among the
forums - - political, planning, and operational - - and the dialogues among
the different levels of the government. First, the objectives of the program
were transformed by each forums' search for immediate goals through
problem-setting and problem-solving processes as it was transmitted from
one forum to another. Second, each forum put its own stamp on the public
housing program in an effort to gain control over the program; it was
politicized, professionalized, and operationalized over time. Third, the
incongruity between the espoused policy and the policy-in-use of each forum
became an inherited characteristics of the dialogues. Fourth, disjointedness
of the dialogues across the forums truncated and transformed the link
between the error-detection and error-correction processes; one forum
detected errors, but another corrected them with responses that reflects its,
rather than the error-detecting forum's needs and pressures.
5.1.1 The Dialectical Process of Problem-Setting and Problem-
Solving: The Forum as a Learning Site
The following model is formulated in order to illustrate the basic scheme
of the process that generated mismatches between what the government
intended to do and what it actually accomplished. The model explains the
prototype of how problem-setting and problem-solving shifted and how the
concepts were transformed as they transmitted through the forums
(Diagram 5-1).
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Within the political forum, the initial problem was assessed as a lack of
"social welfare" (PST 1) credentials. This notion of social welfare played a
major role in shaping the public housing policy for low-income groups. As
the notion of "public housing for social welfare" (PSL 1) was passed on to the
planning forum, the focus of the public housing process became the "physical
planning and design" (PST 2) of public housing. Consequently, appropriate
planning and design ideals for low-income groups were sought by the
planners, and solutions were focused on the design guidelines for "physical
development" (PSL 2). Once the "physical development" notions were
pipelined to the operational forum, practical difficulties in getting land for
public housing arose and reshaped the problem. The operational forum
crystalized the problem as "land acquisition" (PST 3). Naturally, the
problem-solving efforts for this particular problem hinged on finding a
method to obtain land for development, such as through a joint venture (PSL
3).
Each time a problem transmitted to a different forum, the problem-
setting and problem-solving processes took on the characteristics, biases,
and needs of the forum.
At the beginning of the program, the new administration of Chiang
Ching-Kuo wanted to appear to be responsible and to exhibit strong
leadership, and to launch a bold and sound policy that would unite the
people and win their support and loyalty and bring them into the
government's fold. In order to secure the support of not only Chiang Kai-
Shek's old supporters, but also of the opposition and the newly emerged
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leading group, the new administration needed to promote public programs
that seemed to benefit constituents. The public housing program was one
such program.
Chiang and his Executive Yuan advisors were learning how to solidify his
political position in the face of the U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan's
relationship with Japan, and internal political turbulence. Launching
centralized public housing was Chiang Ching-Kuo's survival gesture. It was
the political forum's concern about solidifying Chiang's political position
that induced them to seek to use housing as an instrument to solve that
problem. Nevertheless, the political forum had a measure of genuine
concern for housing the poor, which was compounded by urbanization.
Chiang and his advisors responded to Taiwan's political unrest during
the Gestation Period by initiating the public housing program; the program
was also intended to correct Chiang Kai-Shek's neglect of social welfare.
Chiang Ching-Kuo's administration, his opposition spoke for the poor, who
had been traditionally underrepresented; the opposition then, in a sense,
gave Chiang Ching-Kuo social welfare as an issue.
The Executive Yuan decided that housing could be the instrument for
solving the variety of social and political problems facing Chiang. The
political forum asked the planners to prepare a method for developing public
housing. The planning forum accepted the task and supported it with an
estimation of a wild shortage. For the planners, this was an opportunity to
promote their profession. In the course of using housing as an instrument,
the planners provided the rationale that a housing shortage existed, and,
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that moreover the private sector was ill-equipped to provide housing for the
poor. In addition, the super-block concept and the Singaporan precedent
were incorporated into the Taiwanese public housing program. In other
words, they learned from the outside experience, not from their own.
At the same time, orderly procedures of construction and distribution
were needed as an example to influence the private sector, particularly the
ever-increasing informal and sometimes disreputable housing construction
companies. During the Gestation Period, the planning forum believed that
it should and could induce the private sector to adopt business practices that
protected home buyers; it set itself up as a model for the private sector by
standardizing the design and implementation process of public housing. The
public housing program would produce moderate housing units for middle-
income families. The planning forum believed that this' could be a way to
protect home buyers from unjust contracts created by "presale" and "joint
venture" schemes devised by the private developers and the housing
industry. Selling housing units with standardized features, using codified
procedures, and providing financial support constituted the characteristics of
a model case. It is important to note that most of the housing experts in
Taiwan were either architects or economists. Their professional training led
them to focus on the physical aspects of the public housing units after the
economic problem of providing funding public housing had been settled. The
professionalized public housing program became an opportunity for the
planners to design and build high-rise apartments.
In planning the public housing sites, the planners adapted the super-
block site to show private developers that efficient land use could be achieved
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by combining high-rise apartments and open space for greenery and
playgrounds. However, planners learned from the private developers that
the location of the housing sites played a major role in how rapidly they could
be sold. Despite their understanding of the importance of location, the
planners virtually ignored it and concentrated on the physical aspect of
housing units, the target number of units to be built, and other procedures of
public housing. Unlike the private developers, who did not have to build if
they could not find suitable locations, the production system had to operate
continuously.
The government intended to be a leading force in housing development,
but its actual experience was pragmatic; the government changed objectives
and methods in order to achieve immediate goals rather than policy
objectives. For example, after conferring with prospective clients, the
planners altered the designs that had been agreed on in several joint
venture projects: instead of designing "good" public housing as they claimed,
the planners followed the clients' preferences.
During the Centralized Planning Stage, the program was launched and
exhausted its initial resources, particularly land. The public housing
agencies now faced problems similar to those of the private housing industry
and of both formal and informal housing developers. It became difficult to
acquire large sites to build public housing units. Moreover, the central
government's evaluation of the public housing program at that time was
based on efficient goal achievement, that is, on the number of units the
agencies built. The local housing agencies' performance was evaluated by
both the central and local governments. In other words, there was pressure
108
from mayors and governors to build more housing units because the number
of units was perceived as a political index of the administration's efficiency
and its concern to the upper layers of the government for the housing
problems facing their constituents.
Acquiring land became an increasingly difficult task for the local
governments. In order to ease the difficulty, they engaged in a joint venture
with the Department of Defense. On the one hand, this alliance made it
virtually impossible to target the original group -- the low-income families --
because the housing sites had originally been used by the Department of
Defense as a site for housing military personnel. After the new housing
development was completed, the land would be returned to the Department
of Defense. On the other hand, launching the joint venture increased the
apparent productivity of the public housing program merely because more
housing units were built. In the city of Taipei, most of the housing units
constructed during 1981 and 1982 were actually rehabilitated housing sites
of military personnel and their families. In 1983, the evaluation reported to
President Chiang showed that Taipei had the best performance in the public
housing program and had surpassed the number of housing units set as the
goal by the public housing plan.
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5.1.2 The Dominant Forums
This transformation process of problem-setting and problem-solving
reveals the major forces that interacted with each other behind the task of
public housing. This process reveals how the public housing programs were
politicized, professionalized, and operationalized over time. The political
forum , which interacted mainly with the planning forum, which interacted
mainly with the operational forum, was the major force behind the first
contradictory concept; the planning forum was the primary vehicle, behind
the second; and the operational forum, which interacted with the political
forum was the principal medium, behind the third. (Diagram 5.2)
5.1.3 The Incongruities between Espoused Policy and
Policy-in-use
In order to examine the espoused policy and policy-in-use of the public
housing programwe must examine what the government stated to do and
what the government was actually doing. The incongruity can be
recapitulated by two contradictory themes that the three forums framed
housing shortages and housing vacancies.
Under the rubric of these two problem formulations, three pairs of
contradictory concepts have been fundamental to the structure of the
historical stages and periods of the Taiwanese public housing process: (1)
social welfare versus political self-defense; (2) the government as the
leading force in housing development versus the government as a subject of
market forces; and (3) the government as a coherent system versus the
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government as a system consisting of those who are at the center and those
who are at the periphery. As explained earlier, the public housing program
was launched as a tool for social welfare, that is, its goal was to provide
housing for the poor. The incongruity is rooted in the contradiction between
the espoused policy intention and policy-in-use. The contradiction was
revealed in changing the target income group from the low-income group to
the middle-income group. The public housing program became a tool not for
social welfare but for gaining political stability. The government felt it had
to create housing for the poor because it wanted to win over popular support
and because it did not consider the private sector to be well-equipped for this
task. When the government implemented the public housing program, the
criteria for eligibility and housing loans clearly show that the intended
purpose of using public housing as a tool for achieving social welfare was not
well-grounded. The Public Housing Act specified that the requirements of
eligibility needed to be formulated, but the task of formulating them was left
to the "adequate housing authority." Before the Department of Housing and
Planning of the Council for Economic Development tried informally and
internally to set up eligibility guidelines, no action had been taken. The
council based eligibility on income level and the affordability of public
housing, with the following results: in order to apply for a public housing
unit, (1) one had to have a family, (2) the family could not already own a
house, (3) the family had to have lived in a particular city longer than six
months, and (4) the family income had to be higher than NT $49,000 per
month, which is equivalent to the income for a full professor at a private
university in Taiwan. These criteria constituted the policy-in-use, which
was the hidden reality of the housing program.
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The eligibility criteria accommodated the general goal of providing
housing for the public but did so within a framework acceptable to middle
income families. In fact, the central public housing agency did not make
establishing eligibility criteria a priority during the program's initial years.
However, after the policy was implemented, the central housing team faced
considerable pressure from the housing experts in universities and the mass
media, although there was no clear consensus on the need to set up income
levels for eligibility. As a result, establishing detailed criteria for eligibility
was left to the local housing agencies. The local agencies decided that a
moderate-or low-income family who did not own a house and have lived in
the administrative area for longer than six months would be eligible for
public housing.
The public housing program seems to have been the administration's
political self-defense program in the guise of a program of social welfare for
the poor. The planners' professional standards for public housing seem to
have dictated the kinds of product which were not within the low-income
families' affordability. The "crash production" of public housing units
occurred just before the public housing program was evaluated at a time
there were problems selling the units, it appears that local operational forum
was producing units in order to respond to their own pressure of meeting the
target numbers. The following tables show the espoused policies and
policies-in-use of each forum, which sometimes acted incongruently and
sometimes in concert. The incongruities between the policies became
inherited characteristics of the dialogues among the forums and between
the central and local governments. (See Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3)
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Table 5.1 The Political Forum: the incongruity
between espoused policy and policy-in-use
Espoused Policy Policy-in-use
* To improve living conditions * To do something about housing, a
according to the Three-People's practical reality
Principle
* To improve social welfare policy 0 To gain political support and
minimize opposition power
" To make bold reforms in policy 0 To minimize the uncertainty
about the success of public
housing by emulating the
Singaporan precedent
* To shelter the poor and 0 To demonstrate that Chiang
middle- income families Ching-Kuo, unlike Chiang Kai-
Shek, cared about people's lives
* To show the nation's capacity
when China became close to the
U.S.
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Table 5.2 The Planning Forum: the incongruity
between espoused policy and policy-in-use
Espoused Policy
* To develop an example for the
private sector to follow
" To improve housing technology
* To improve housing conditions
* To shelter the poor
I
I
Policy-in-use
* To promote and expand the
planning profession (visibility
within and outside the forum)
* To experiment with new
technology and to make the
public housing program a
showcase
* To design stylish and
monumental housing
* To guide the residents how and
where to live.
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Table 5.3 The Operational Forum: the incongruity
between espoused policy and policy-in-use
Espoused Policy Policy-in-use
" To achieve the goal of the public 0 To obtain better evaluations from
housing program the political leaders in the central
government
" To improve the local community * To win political and economic
rewards in the competition with
other local governments
* To shelter the poor 0 To gain support from local
constituents
116
5.1.4 The Disjointed Dialogues among the Forums
During the Gestation Period, dialogue flowed mainly from the political
forum to the planning forum, which generated the centralized public housing
program. Decisions were made by the political forum within the specific
socio-economic and political context of Taiwan and Singaporan precedent
serving as a stimulus. The dialogue between the political forum and the
planning forum was an authoritative exchange of decisions and ideas. The
political forum made decisions, and the planning forum received and
rationalized them. The political advisors to Chang Ching-Kuo, the
Executive Yuan, and the planners in the universities were the major
participants. The dialogue was a disjointed, yet a cooperative one in which
the housing problem was framed and the Housing Act of 1975 was prepared.
The Centralized Planning Stage consisted mainly of the dialogues
between the planning and the operational forums, where issues related to
public housing were formulated and exposed, such as eligibility, loan
conditions, the target population, and production goals. The planning forum
dictated the notion of appropriate design and planning by adopting the
super-block concept, restricted land use, and a technology-driven
construction method. These adaptations excluded communications between
the clients and the planners and eventually resulted in producing high-rises,
and prefabricated apartment buildings for middle-income groups, which in
turn, (1) helped to deepen the mismatch between what residents wanted and
what housing agencies built, and (2) increased difficulties in obtaining
housing sites large enough to accommodate "super-block" housing. The
exclusive communication within planning forum during the Centralized
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Planning Stage helped to slow sales in housing units, which in turn
aggravated the high vacancy rate.
A typical example of disjointed dialogues among the forums can be
found during the Evaluation Period. When the planning forum noticed the
"lerror" in trying to build more when the vacancy rate was high, the
operational forum did not react positively to the planning forum's guidelines
to stop building. The evaluation by the political forum pushed the
operational forum to reach the targeted numbers of units of housing as far as
they could achieve. Achieving the target given the difficulty of land
acquisition created the conditions that led to the joint venture. In the joint
venture projects, the design and the size of a unit were changed to meet the
residents' demands, which led to revising the Public Housing Act to
accommodate the changes.
The work-related dialogue and the power-or authority-related dialogue
were in conflict. and disjointed. . At the local government level, the
Department of Public Housing was in limbo during the Evaluation Period.
The department was getting two different signals, one from the central
planning forum, which suggested that building housing units be stopped
until the problem of selling the stock was solved; the other came from the
mayors and Hsien leaders, who urged the department to build more. The
former signal was a professional suggestion directly related to the attempts
to reduce the vacancy rate, in other words, to reduce the unsold housing
stock; the latter signal was an authoritative suggestion sparked by the fact
that the provincial government was preparing a report evaluating the local
governments' performance in the public housing program. Moreover, the
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central planning forum did not communicate with the political forum about
the problematic low sales at the initial stage, because the planning forum
wanted to maintain its professional turf on public housing program and to
reduce a possible stoppage of the whole program by the political forum.
At the local level, a conflict arose between the mayor's group and the
public housing group; it was a conflict between bureaucratic authority and
expert advice. As it would be in other cases, authority overrode expertise,
because the local public housing group's career was, in most part, under the
control of the mayors and Hsien leaders, whose career was mostly controlled
by the central political forum. As long as the central political forum held
and imposed the old target to the local operational forum, it was inevitable
to continue building in order to meet the original target.
5.2 Institutional Learning in the Public Housing Process
How can we understand all the characteristics of the dialogue that
occurred in the Taiwanese Public Housing Process in light of institutional
learning? Has institutional learning even occurred? If so, what form did it
take?
In order to answer these questions, we must explain the kinds of
institutional learning that occurred in the Public Housing Process based on
the characteristics of the dialogue in the error-detection and error-correction
processes (Sch6n, 1971, 1974 and 1987).
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5.2.1 Temporary Learning
Different actors appeared at different stages and different times in the
process. During the Gestation Period, the political forum was the major
actor.
During the Centralized Planning Stages, the planning forum was the
major actor. During the Evaluation Period, the operational forum was the
major actor. The lessons learned tended to be temporary because 1) the
patterns of inter-and intra-forum dialogue were often exclusive,
protective, one-way, authoritative, and evaluative; 2) the institutional
memory that could serve as a common ground for the old and the new was
lacking or at least inadequate and incomplete because it presented only
simplified version of results, not the process or the problems they faced and
solved; 3) error-detection was often done by one group and error-correction
by another.
5.2.2 Local Learning
The implementation process of the Taiwanese public housing program
was basically one of formulating policies and revising the Public Housing
Act of 1975. In a way, in J. Turner's terms, it was not "legislative learning"
but "administrative planning." Not all of the procedures and regulations
were specified; some were left to the implementors to formulate and design.
Despite flexible policy design and implementation, local planners, were not
able to detect and correct errors coherently. Why? The answer lies in the
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pattern of the link between error-detection and error-correction: it was
disjointed. For example, in the vacancy issue, error -detection was done by
the planners at the local level and then reported to both the mayors and the
planners at the center; yet decisions on the actions for error-correction
were made by the mayors. In the dialogue between the local operational
forum and the planning forum, local planners fretted over the low sales, but
the problem was ignored by most mayors, or else error-correction occurred
without consideration for the needs of prospective clients. The local
operational forum decided to eliminated some features of the housing sites,
which had already been designed for the middle-income group; in turn, the
misappropriated design further lowered sales, this time to the middle-
income group.
The local planners' questions to the central planners nevertheless
produced partial answers yet did not produce effective error-correction.
The questions created a dialogue between the central and local planning
forum, but they ultimately worked against the local planners. For the
central planners suggested stopping buildings to the local planners without
having had an open dialogue with the political forum, which in fact had
almost absolute power over the local political and the operational forums,
particularly over the local mayors and the Hsien leaders, who essentially
controlled the local planners'job security.
Therefore, local learning experienced within a forum that is characterized
by patterns of exclusive, withholding, blocking, or subsiding dialogues has a
life of its own; its chances of surviving and being incorporated into the global
level is almost minimal.
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Centralization is often practiced in developing countries, where the
centralized system is assumed to produce streamlined and uniform
implementation of a certain policy. However, the Taiwan case strongly
shows that without a flow of dialogue, particularly from the local level to the
center, and without a careful monitoring system, centralized planning does
not necessarily produce uniform and streamlined, let alone effective,
implementation. Instead, it creates "crash production" just before an
evaluation occurs.
5.2.3 Instrumental Learning
Instrumental learriing provides "tools, implements, and devices."
(Schon, 1987) Errors are continually detected and corrected; instrumental
learning automatically presumes the link between means and ends. In the
Taiwanese case, inventing the joint venture is a good example of a distorted
instrumental learning.
Distorted instrumental learning can result from two causes. First, the
lack of a monitoring mechanism (Schon, 1987); and second, the lack of an
active and open dialogue among the forums. Because there was no coherent
agency to monitor the overall process in the Taiwanese Public Housing
Process, shifts in target groups, eligibility requirements, and development
framework occurred. In the absence of a monitoring process, an
environment in which suitable for the operational forum can define its
own means and ends by default; or else it can devise tools for
implementation just to achieve exclusively defined means and ends.
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The lack of open dialogue among different forums can be damaging in
highly authoritative systems because it inhibits the flow of communication
between the local and the central level and, more importantly, among the
different groups within an organization.
The exclusive dialogue may paralyze the appropriate function of a
forum - - particularly the one such as the planning forum in Taiwan, which is
based on professional knowledge or expertise - - because instrumental
learning can induce members to produce the tools , implements, and devices
that merely deepen inappropriate professionalization. As a result, means
and ends may diverge even more widely. At the same time, the lack of open
dialogue among the forums can distort monitoring system, even if it exists:
the dominating forum may impose its own idea of appropriate means and
ends.
5.2.4 Imitative Learning
Imitation of Singaporan public housing development and of western
ideals for city design played a different role in each forum. The political
forum took the Singaporan case as assurance that such a project could work,
as a feasibility study in the real world. The planning forum took the
Singaporan case and the western ideals as standards for their profession and
rationalized its public housing plan using those standards
The problem was that the dialogue between the political and planning
forums was inadequate. The political forum dictated the order of work to the
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planning forum, and the planning forum had to live with the contradictions
that developed between its policies and those of the planning forum.
The planners were supposed to work on comprehensive public housing
plan, but they were forced to work on a piecemeal version of their original
plan and were limited to working on housing units.
Because the Taiwanese public housing agencies did not have authority
to work with other agencies, such as regional development and
transportation agencies, they were unable to implement any housing plans
that included inter-agency cooperation. For example, the planners had to
seek the help not of agencies but of mayors in order to acquire land.
A critical difference between Singapore and Taiwan was the amount of
authority given to the public housing agencies. The Singaporan Public
Housing Board had absolute authority and power to handle the relevant
facilities so that the location of housing could be coordinated with job sites
and availability of transportation . In Singapore, "housing estates," instead
of "housing units," were being developed by the Public Housing Board.
Imitating western ideals had more twists. The traditional utopian
planning examples - Le Corbusier's tall buildings and green malls in the city
of Tomorrow (1924) and Ebenerzer Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow
(1899), both of which were the "ABC" of planning education -- influenced
planners in Taiwan in a particular way: They not only considered those
designs to be more than examples of utopian planning, but also used them to
effect the policy changes by Chiang Ching-Kuo's reform administration.
Although those utopian notions did not survive the whole implementation
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process, and changed over time, they were initially persuasive . The
planners used the utopian approach as the professional standard, worthy of
emulation; yet it was used by the planning forum to rationalize the reform
administration's decisions and to demonstrate that it was ready to solve the
housing problem. The utopian approach was in fact a pragmatic and
purposive approach
5.3 The Taiwanese Institutional Setting
All of the processes were orchestrated within the Taiwanese institutional
setting. How, then, were all of the processes , disjointed and transformed,
actually orchestrated? To answer this question, we need to know about
Taiwan's specific institutional setting, which held all of these processes
together.
The fundamental tenet of Taiwanese politics thus far is the acceptance
of Taiwan as politically indivisible from mainland China. In other words,
Taiwan is one of the provinces of the Republic of China, which includes
mainland China; and Taipei City is the temporary capital. This tenet has
been tested and challenged by the opposition; any debate on "independence"
is still Taiwan's most politically sensitive issue. The "one China" view has
remained generally acceptable, and there is a tacit understanding within
the government that it is an unimpeachable view.
The KMT, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the "Tangwai"
(independents; literally, the term means "outside of the party") all favor
free enterprise and oppose pollution and corruption. The primary concerns
of the people are the concept of an "iron rice bowl" - - that is, job security - -
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and the traditional concept of "guanshi," - - a personal network or
connections. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Taiwanese pragmatism
and an anti-political bais are also important components of the process. The
political and popular norms of Taiwan all produced the peculiar method of
dialogue and the orchestration that occurred in the Public Housing Process.
For example, the joint venture scheme may have seemed like the product of
a crusading extremist or selfish zealot. Although the self-interest of the
bureaucracy paved the way for the joint venture and for the choice of target
group, the scheme was also a product of pragmatism. It was a politically
possible and technically attainable operation, based on shared values: it was
also not prohibitively offensive to the participants in the public housing
program. The pragmatism was based on the need to reduce complex
problems to a solvable level in the most "effective" and "productive" way.
The major distortion resulting from the joint venture was the change in the
client or target group from low-income households to military personnel.
Military personnel- -retired and working-- are politically important
constituents. This group migrated with Chang Kai-Shek from mainland
China and provides the basic political support for the leading Nationalist
party, the Kuo-Min-Tang . Moreover, improvements in military housing
were needed.
Helping the soldiers was not terribly offensive to the participants in the
public housing program, as it may have been in other countries because the
military personnel seemed not to be be better off economically in Taiwan.
Their economic status is the result of the separation of politics and
economy, which is more sharply defined in Taiwan than in other Confucian
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countries, such as Korea and China.That is why, although some of the
housing units were assigned to retired high-ranking officers, the joint
venture scheme did not spawn street-level debates. Although there were
discussions among the planners, it did not go beyond the planners' circle
mainly because: 1) anything political did not have to be discussed, at least
not encouraged; 2) cross-forum dialogue was not open between the planners
and the politicians; and 3) the very concern for keeping their positions safe
was rather important. As a result, the planners cooperated in the venture
despite their disagreement with the Executive Yuan's direction. Moreover,
the Council's political power at this time was weaker than during the
Gestation Period when Chang Ching-Kuo was actively involved in the
Executive Yuan. Therefore, what the planners at the Council got was not
the power to resteer the direction or to raise inquiries, but the task of
coordinating and advising. Some of the planners understood their role as
neither a coordinating nor an advisory role ; it was rather a staffing role.
Moreover, regardless of differences in opinion, most officers and planners
in the government agencies were members of the same party, which valued
its constituents' support. Planners needed to support any planning agenda
that would not spawn much controversy. After nearly two decades of
seemingly malign neglect of planning, public housing had slowly worked its
way back into the national political agenda, a welcome sign for the
planners' "iron rice bowl," that is, their job security, which they valued the
most.
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5.4 Summary
I have explained the shifts that occurred in the Taiwanese Public
Housing Process by analyzing the characteristics of the dialogues among and
within the forums and among the different levels of the government. . First,
each forum put its own stamp on the public housing program to gain control
over the program; the program was politicized, professionalized, and
operationalized over time. Second, the objectives of the program were
transformed by each forum's search for immediate goals through problem-
setting and problem-solving processes as the problem was transmitted from
one forum to another. Third, the original incongruity between the espoused
policy and policy-in-use of each forum became an intrinsic feature of the
dialogues. Fourth, disjointedness of the dialogues across the forums
truncated and transformed the link between the error-detection and error-
correction processes. An analysis of the complex process behind the changes
reveals that institutional learning occurred in the Taiwanese public housing
process within each forum but not across the forums. The kinds of learning
that occurred in the Taiwanese Public Housing Process included temporary,
instrumental, imitative, and local learning, but not global or double-loop
learning.
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6 CONCLUSION:
THE EXPLANATORY VALUE OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
PERSPECTIVE AND ITS THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS
We began this study by questioning how we could explain the changes in
a government, particularly the changes that occurred in the Public Housing
Process in Taiwan. We identified several possible theories for explaining
the changes: the emergence of a new personality or leader to carry changes
forward; political contention that results in restructuring policies and goals;
the emergence of a new fashion that is slavishly followed; and the swing of a
pendulum from one policy extreme to the other. Each of the theories has
some value for explaining the changes that occurred in the Taiwanese
Public Housing Process.
A new leader emerged. Chiang Ching-Kuo undertook the reform of
housing policy with the stated goal of providing housing for low-income
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groups. Political contention during the Gestation Period was the underlying
force that pushed the adoption of a new policy into being. The behavior of the
planning forum was shaped by the new fashion of super-block housing
promoted in Western settings. A pendulum swing can be identified in the
shift that occurred from the decentralized management of the housing
program to the centralized housing program.
Let us examine the implications of these theories. The theoretical and
practical implications for future policy interventions are embedded in any
theoretical formulation. Let us explore what these perspectives explain
about changes and what they imply about changes in the future. The
perspectives identified so far have limitations in explaining the changes that
occurred in the Taiwanese Public Housing Process; however, these notions
can be incorporated into the institutional learning perspective.
6.1 The Personality Theory in the Context of Learning
Changes in personality or leadership may be important for bringing
about policy changes, particularly in a setting where the power for decision-
making is exclusive to a certain group in a bureaucracy. From the
perspectives of personality theory, the most plausible explanation for policy
changes is that changes in leadership bring about policy changes, and an
improvement in leadership results in improved policy decisions. However,
this perspective does not adequately explain the background forces, the
context nor the environment that might have been instrumental in bringing
a particular leader to power. More importantly, learning might have
occurred behind the changes of personnel, which the personality theory
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oversimplifies. For example, the reforms into policy promoted by the new
leader Chiang Ching-Kuo may appear to have been simple shifts. But, on
closer inspection of all the factors involved, the shifts were the results of a
careful process of top-down political inquiry, which had its own way of error-
detection and error-correction described in the previous chapter.
The introduction of a new political leader, indeed, effected changes in
Taiwan's housing policy. Chang Ching-Kuo instituted a reform policy in
public housing because he needed to prove that he differed from his father
Chiang Kai-Shek. He made policy decisions for the future using the lessons
of the past in the hope of correcting the errors in his political legacy. He
extended the responsibility of the government to the public housing sphere
in order to rectify the absence of his father's welfare credentials. Therefore,
beneath the facade of changes in leadership, there were threads of error-
detection and error-correction.
6.2 The Pendulum in the Context of Learning
The pendulum theory explains the results of the changes at the global
level; however, but it does not explain the process of changes. the theory
overlooks the local inquiries and reflection, particularly those that failed to
bring about changes at the global level. The obvious implication of the
pendulum theory is that predicting changes lies in measuring the tendency
for a given set of policies to fail: it can predict that there will soon be a
change that swings policy in another direction.
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The changes in the public housing process in Taiwan appear to range
from one extreme to the other. For example, there is clear evidence that the
structure of public housing changed from a decentralized to a centralized
system. Indeed, these changes seem like swings of a pendulum,
characterized by a simple version of learning lacking intelligent reflection
before the next course of action is chosen. In other words, the failure was
detected, but the errors that led to the failure were not. As a result, error-
correcting is a simple veering away from the previous attempt. This form of
learning also seems to exhibit trial-and-error, which is a a process of
searching for possibly correct combinations by depending on simple
probability. In other words, the errors were not detected, but the process of
detecting errors may have been going on by eliminating "wrong"
combinations. In the Taiwanese case, at the espoused level, the behavior
appears to be pendulum-like; however, at the in-use level, the behavior of
the forums in particular included error-detection and error-correction. It
took a top-down formal inquiry to link error-detection and error-correction
during the Gestation Period in achieving changes in policy. However, during
the Evaluation Period, bottom-up informal inquiries on public housing were
made. Therefore, we can safely say that the kinds of learning that occurred
in the Taiwanese Housing Process were more sophisticated than simple
swings.
6.3 The Fashion Theory in the context of Learning
The fashion theory can describe how information is transmitted to
different locales, but it may not be sufficient for explaining how information
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was transformed into the ideas-in-good-currency. It describes a kind of
imitative learning. However, it masks the importance of the process by
which some ideas are actually used and transformed. Certain changes may
look like a result of a popular notion, yet there may be some other critical
reasons for choosing ideas-in-good-currency. One drawback to the fashion
theory is a danger of applying this notion to describe changes without
clarifying who has access to the information, who controls it, and who
disperses it. Application of this theory could create a "monster" of idea
brokers for certain schools of thought, which again might be controlled by
political power games in a society. It may be a starting point for dividing
the invention side and the imitation side, which may in fact be a classical
power struggle in a political market of information.
The fashion theory can be incorporated with the learning perspective.
Particularly the way Taiwanese planners subscribed to Western ideals and
the politician's subscription to the Singaporan precedent was in a way
imitating a fashion from the outside, responding to the popular ideas.
Reflecting upon a similar context for a perceived problem may be a part of
error-detection. The error was corrected by subscribing the popular ideas or
solutions to the problem perceived as similar . The critical question in this
case lies in the link between the error-detection and error-correction. The
link was based on imitation and second-handed solutions. For example, the
political forum in the Public Housing Process perceived the Singaporan case
as a feasibility study in a real world. Moreover, the similar Chinese ethnic
background in both Taiwan and Singapore might have increased the
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probability of being the "right" combination to choose and to be adopted
successfully.
6.4 Political Contention Theory in the Context of Learning
The political contention theory explains changes stemming from power
struggles and political games played within the environment of the
decision-making system. It describes how one group can gain control over a
certain area of policy and how a group dynamic can work politically to
create changes. However, it seems inevitable to prescribe to play the game
better, in other words, how to be sensitive to the power structure and win; it
leaves no foreseeable way to improve the process of making changes in
policy. This view would maintain that some rational and professional
inquiries are incapable of gaining control over the pQlitical contention
unless they are utilized to rationalize or legitimize the decisions already
made. At the same time, in describing the win-lose games of political power,
the political contention theories tend to simplify the makings or foundations
of groups; they tend to polarize the groups or classes.
The political contention theory would hold that political struggle that
results in gaining control of some policy area, which is subjected to the
conflicting interests among different groups, can explain changes in policy
and development of a certain policy, particularly the legitimacy of state
intervention in social policy, welfare, housing , and education (Castells,
Harms, Saville). To maintain stability and efficiency, "control" was used to
achieve the self-interest of a state and a ruling class. Saville indicates that
"--- the stability of society is threatened by dirt, disease and poverty, and the
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calculation of changes [underline mine] favorable to general efficiency of the
economy--run right through the middle class debates--." ( Saville, 1957: 8) In
other words, if political contention theory is applied to explaining the
changes in and the development of the public housing process, the
conceiving the Public Housing Act would be conceived of as a concession
from the ruling or dominant class to the oppressed one, in return for the
security of the ruling class. Crisis theory explains how political contention
effects change by arguing that, in order to maintain political security and
economic efficiency without seriously weakening the ruling class's position,
concessions must be made in the areas of projects and services for the
oppressed class. For example, James O'Connor argues that "social expenses
consist of projects and services that are required to maintain social harmony
-- to fulfill the state's legitimization function." (1973:7) Several assumptions
are implicit in this explanation. First, it assumes that the political ruling
group and economic ruling group are interchangeable, at least, that they
constitute a homogeneous interest group. Second, it assumes that the state
identifies exclusively with the ruling or dominant class. Third, it assumes
that the poor are militant and well-organized for action, so it is necessary to
suppress the turbulent masses.
Was there a crisis in Taiwan that threatened the stability of the ruling
class? In the case of Taiwan, the housing policy was catalyzed not by a
housing crisis, but by a crisis in international relations. Despite contentions
of housing shortages, the housing supply rate was 99 % nationwide.
Although there were problems in distribution and the speculation in
housing in larger cities such as Taipei and Kaoshiung, there was obviously
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no crisis calling for a national housing policy aimed at producing more
housing units nationwide, except that regional development and population
redistribution were needed to reduce migration to the cities and congestion.
Public housing policy in Taiwan was rather a workable solution to the
political crisis created by the Beijing Communique. The political contention
theory explains the partial link between the social movement during the
beginning of 1970's and the changes in public housing policy in 1975.
The pubic sector that intended to solve the housing problem for the poor
turned out to be helping the middle-income group. The state, indeed, might
have had an interest in helping the middle-income group alone from the
very beginning. Such a hypothesis partially explains why the target group
became distorted. The political contention theory explains changes based on
the results and effects but not the process of analyzing and attempting to
overcome difficulties. By doing so, the theory often simplifies and polarizes the
government's intentions.
We can identify other limitations of using political contention theory
alone. In Taiwan, the political ruling group is not necessarily the
economically dominant class. The immigrants from the mainland have been
the ruling group in a political sense, but the native Taiwanese constitute the
largest portion of the economic ruling group. Moreover, within the political
system, politicians, planners, and administrators have seemingly different
interests. Therefore, the members of a government do not necessarily sing the
same tune. Finally, many authors in the informal sector in the developing
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countries have shown that the poor are usually not militant, and may not be
opponents of the ruling administration (see Janice Perlman, for example).
Pye (1985) even went so far as to conclude that the whole population in
Taiwan was anti-political.
Even when all of these theories are added together to account for the
Taiwanese public housing process, they are inadequate for explaining the
whole story of Taiwan. However, it has been our purpose throughout this
research to unravel the complex nature of the public housing process and,
at the same time, to suggest a general framework that can capture and
identify some critical threads that can be applied to designing a model for a
systematic policy intervention process, that can emphasize a learning
capacity whose absence might produce error-detection and error-correction
that would be buried, ignored. or distorted.
6.5 Explanatory Value of the Institutional Learning
Theory
The strengths of the institutional learning framework lie in the
following main areas:
(1) It provides an ideology-free framework for unraveling and "threading
out" the process of error-detection and error-correction; the process may
result in either success or failure in bringing about changes;
(2) It provides a research methodology for integrating both top-down and
bottom-up processes, which can explain behavior at the institutional
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level as well as the behavior of the members of "forums" that may or
may not be translated to an institutional level;
(3) It gives a clue for an explanation of policy interventions during so-called
"dark" periods, which might look like stoppages of institutional workings;
but which might be pivotal periods that incorporate different kinds of
learning, and so may in turn bring about changes in the next stage.
(4) It describes both the changes at the levels of espoused policy and the policy-
in-use so that the incongruity between the two is revealed, which often
times can be a critical starting point for understanding the real
processes behind the changes.
(5) It implies that policy design and implementation can be improved through
increasing capacity for selected and desirable kinds of learning, i.e., by
exercising certain kinds of dialogues among and within the forums in
order to stimulate policy inquiries which may be raised from reflecting
upon their policy-in-use: the environment often looks like a system
where swinging pendulum-like policy changes, leadership changes occur
and where some fashionable ideas prevail, yet political games are
played to control the direction and shape of a policy. However, even the
political games might have been composed of different kinds and levels
of learning.
(6) It provides a new conceptual understanding of what is commonly
perceived as and called "learning": all the learning may not necessarily
be "'desirable" or "good" learning.
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(7) It also gives new critical and realistic criteria for policy evaluation: not
successes or failures based on the results, but the processes for producing
results.
Although
theory does
perspectives,
example, my
concerns and
changes both
leaning may be buried by political games, the learning
not fall into the passive and conventional "doomsday"
from which no policy intervention can be invented. For
interviews in Taiwan led me to believe that there are genuine
available energy to find a process that brings about positive
inside and outside of the government.
The following sets of propositions are distilled from this research for
those wishing to study institutional learning further in policy design and
the implementation of housing and other policy areas.
* Implementation was itself a policy-making process.
* The distortion or the shift away from the intention was due not only to
the implementation process but also to the incongruity between the
espoused policy and policy-in-use.
* The characteristics of dialogue among and within the forums dictated
the characteristics of error-detection and error-correction and the link
between the two, which in turn characterized the kinds of
institutional learning that occurred in the Taiwanese Public Housing
Process.
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